THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

PROJECT REPORT

REPORT ON A TWO-YEAR COOPERATION PROJECT WITH PEACE ACTIVISTS FROM SOMALIA, RWANDA, EX-YUGOSLAVIA, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

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CONTENT

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF THE PROJECT

In December 2008, during the opening ceremony for the foundation of the strategic office of the Rosa Luxemburg in Brussels, some of the invitees gathered informally and talked about their experiences as peace and human rights activists. Bosiljka Schedlich of the Southeast European Cultural Centre In Berlin, who had worked against the war in Yugoslavia in the diaspora and had initiated many psychological and social initiatives with traumatized war refugees; Molly Malekar of Bat-Shalom in Jerusalem, who since the founding of Jerusalem Link in 1994 had maintained cooperation with Palestinian peace activists despite all the blockades and battles; Asha Hagi Elmi from Somalia, who has recently received the Alternative Nobel Prize for her initiative Save the Somali Women and Children, and Birgit Daiber, head of the Brussels office, who had participated in the peace initiatives against the first Iraq War (the Sheherazade Network), against the war in Yugoslavia and for peace in the Middle East. A very lively discussion emerged around the various initiatives and experiences, and soon the question arose: couldn't we try to create a more continual working context? That in turn gave rise to the idea for the project "The Contribution of Women in Peace and Conflict Transformation". The Brussels office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation drafted an initial project outline, and other partners were also recruited: Yolande Mukagasana, author of the first documentations of the genocide in Rwanda (Mukgasana, 1997), Lama Hourani and later Ghada Al-Jadba from Palestine, and Simone Susskind, founder of many essential Euro-Mediterranean peace initiatives, especially Jerusalem Link and the International Women's Committee (IWC).

Thus, four areas of experience were included: Rwanda, Somalia, the Middle East and ex-Yugoslavia: four very different conflict and war contexts, not mutually comparable, different in their respective histories and their socio-cultural and economic contexts, their international frameworks and their intervention strategies, and also different in terms of their specific current situations of war/conflict/ post-war development. However, there is one direct, common and provocative issue: how can it be that the enormous amount of work and experience in peace practice by women and by many selfless man, who are all struggling in their own contexts for compromise and peace has entered to such a small degree into the general strategies of conflict prevention and of positive measures for peace building? And what about support for the civil resistance in war and violent conflict? Is the work for survival which civilian women dedicate to secure their children and their families even noticed? Sometimes, as in the cases of Asha Hagi Elmi, Bosiljka Schedlich or Ruchama Marton, women receive awards and then enjoy a brief moment of public attention, but they then immediately disappear back into their practical projects, through their grassroots work, and when the "big" issues of conflict prevention and conflict transformation arise, women's experience and women's perspective on conflict are hardly ever embedded in the strategies. Nonetheless there certainly have been successes:

THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
PROJECT REPORT, 2011

Two major issues involving women have been incorporated into the official discourse on war and peace since the adoption of Resolution 1325 by the UN in 2000 (1), and the passage in 2008 of UN Resolution 1820 on the criminal prosecution of sexualized wartime violence (2). These are the issues of the rape of women as a measure of war, and the participation of women in the construction of peace processes in the context of Women's Leadership. Woman experts are incorporated into the international court teams for conflict management, and in specific projects (cf. e.g. Kennedy School of Governance, ISIS Europe), and further training strategies for women from conflict regions are being tested, so that their participation can be secured in the construction of civil structures. "A long, tedious international struggle of women has achieved successes in recent years. At the international level, both in the international tribunes and now at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, perpetrators are being prosecuted judicially for raping women. … However, the situation of witnesses in international criminal courts is … difficult from a humanitarian point of view; protection and support are woefully inadequate." (Medica Mondiale, Cologne 2008, p. 11). In an overall accounting, the expert women from many countries at the conference organized in 2008 by Medica Mondiale concluded that in spite of the fact that these criminal acts are internationally, and often even nationally recognized, "women often experience justice systems as inadequate or inaccessible – or even as incapable or unwilling to provide justice to female survivors of rape and other forms of sexualized violence. The inaccessibility of the established justice system is an ongoing problem. These systems are often far removed from the places of residence of women, speak languages foreign to those women, treat women in a hostile manner, and provide no security measures, so that women remain in an unsafe and vulnerable position. Often, participation in legal proceedings is a discouraging experience, and turns the survivors into victims once again." (ibid., p. 33).

This shows that in spite of international recognition of sexual violence as criminal activity, judicial procedures for dealing with such violence is, to phrase it cautiously, often not in a position to do very much to restore the dignity of the women and girls concerned. The fact that it seems so difficult to do justice to the existential human interests of women, even in cases of crimes, may be an indication of the fact of how much more difficult it is to understand societal reality in violent conflicts and wars as power relationships in which gender reality is just as much a constituent part as economic, ethnic nationalistic or religious facts. The primary task is therefore to really root the experience and solution strategies of women as central in conflict transformation strategies.

1.2   PEACE MOVEMENTS AND FEMINIST POSITIONS

Currently, there are 31 violent conflicts and wars worldwide. The international peace movements, by contrast, depend on resistance to war in the conflict regions themselves, but also in the western centres which are involved directly and indirectly in regional conflicts and wars both via the weapons industry and via concrete power interests. But in these multifarious movements and networks, the women's networks

have a specific orientation: "It's the perception that militarism, militarization and war are – only in part, but very significantly – driven and perpetuated by gender relations. Economic factors, like oil or diamonds, drive war, yes. Ethno-national factors like the desire to kill all the Muslims in India, or all Christians and animists in Sudan, yes, they too drive war. But gender factors do also. I emphasize also: This is not to substitute a gender analysis of war for the mainstream analysis, but to propose it as an intrinsic, interwoven, inescapable part of the story." "...As far as militarization and war are concerned I think it's safe to say that (1) economic power, (2) ethnic or national power embodied in community, religious and state structures, and (3) gender power, are the most significant and influential dimensions of power." (Cockburn, p. 1, p. 9, 2008). And further, Cynthia Cockburn: "We need to see warfare as social. War may be deadly, but it's rational. It involves a degree of shared understanding between the warring factions. Only if we understand it this way, can we tease out, among the other relations, those of gender."

War as a social fact, she says, is not only embedded in social structures, but could also be considered a systemic fact; moreover, it is possible to see war as a certain phase in a sequence of conditions which operate as a continuum. This could mean for example, that the participants in civil wars no longer see their goal as being the battle against the enemy, but rather that they have an interest in the continuation of the war and the long-term institutionalization of violence as such. Cockburn reflects on violent conflict and war in the context of patriarchal societal structures, and concludes: "The case rests more firmly on the patriarchal gender relation itself, which is a relation as much between masculinity and femininity as between men and women, a relation of dichotomy and complementarity, hetero-normative, of domination and subordination, characterized by coercion and violence. It's the gender order itself that meshes with the war system in interesting and significant ways." (Cockburn, 2008, pp. 1-5).

Often however, the patriarchal social structures which oppress women also permit them to maintain more subtle social relationships, even in conflict situations. "I know women who exercise leadership not only in NGOs, but also through their own autonomous action at the community level. Precisely because of the gendered way in which they are raised, women have highly developed skills for communication and relationship, and are well practised as bridge builders within the family and community." (Francis, *Open Democracy*, Feb. 2010). Here, women often use subversive tactics to protect their families.

Diana Francis takes up these demands and formulates as the general demand to processes of conflict transformation: "The practitioners and theoreticians of conflict transformation, if they are to be true to their calling, must develop analysis and strategy for transforming the global structures and practices of violence, in a process of global demilitarization that includes minds as well as societies, promoting a very different approach to what is now called 'foreign policy', and a new understanding of power. This is what 'working to scale' requires. It is the only realistic response to the current global nature of the problem." (Francis, *OD* Nov. 2009).

THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROJECT REPORT, 2011

The web discussions on OpenDemocracy address in a concentrated manner the multiplicity of the very different peace movements worldwide. Instead of complaining about their splintered nature, the participants believe that very flexibly and informally organized networks are most meaningful, providing "quiet processes and small circles, in which vital and transforming events take place" (Diana Francis, Sept. 2010). Here, she also addresses the necessity for stronger ties between resistance movements in the development of strategies for solutions: "War resisters and peace policy advocates must keep finding opportunities to talk to each other and experiment with working together, so that our connections can make us more powerful". (Francis, OD, Sept. 2010)

At the concluding symposium of the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS) in 2009 (CCTS Review 41, London, Dec. 2009), Diana Francis presented the results of the work of the CCTS on conflict transformation. She referred to the fact that difference and changes in societal conditions of life are part of the human condition, and that conflicts are therefore often inevitable – especially with regard to fighting injustice and repression. The goal of conflict transformation is therefore not stability and pacification, but rather the well-being and development of societies: "Conflict is potentially constructive, and sometimes necessary to changing things that are unjust. Constructive conflict seeks solutions that address the rights and needs of all who are involved, paving the way for cooperation. Violence contradicts the values of respect and coexistence, so nonviolent methods must be used." (CCTS, 2009, p. 9).

She argues that nonviolent action is not exclusive, but rather inclusive, and gains its power from the participation of the people, both of the weak and of the strong, that it begins with the process of consciousness-raising about the reasons for the existing situation and about the possible collective actions which could change that situation: "No large-scale, well resourced and internationally supported nonviolent action force stands ready to take on such roles to protect and support local people" (ibid., p.11), she points out, but then asks whether it really makes more sense to have armies oppress the entire world? Basically, what is needed is a different understanding of human security and well-being: "We can never be more than relatively and temporarily secure, even those of us who live in the rich world. Learning to live with our insecurity, creatively and caringly, will make far more of us infinitely safer than trying to control the uncontrollable." (ibid., p.11). The major task for peace activists and researchers is, she says, to deconstruct war as a structure. In a chart, Francis counterposes two very different worldviews of "peace building" and "pacification".

TWO WORLD-VIEWS:

Peacebuilding   **Pacification**

NOTION OF PEACE	
Just relationships, mutual care. Shared economic and political power and responsibility. Demilitarised world. Constructive conflict culture and systems. Planet as home.	Stability and hegemony. Top down control, political and economic. Strong military as guarantor of control. Planet as resource to exploit.
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL REGULATION	
Principled and democratic	Conditional and instrumental
APPROACH TO CONFLICT AND CHANGE	
Multi-levelled, bottom-up; work of and in support of local actors.	Top-down, hegemonic, interventionist.
Nonviolent, constructive; achieving just outcome for all.	Military pacification ʻif necessaryʼ in own interest. Win-lose.
CR to address human needs.	CR to avoid destabilisation.
APPROACH TO POWER, REALITY, PROCESS/OUTCOME, PEOPLE	
Power as capacity to achieve things; cooperatively.	Power as ability to dominate.
Process and outcome inseparable.	Process and outcome separate.
All people are subjects, and no-one is expendable.	Some people are instruments and may be expendable.
VALUES	
Common good	Own success
Respect and care for allʼ	Respect for power. Us and ʻthemʼ
NOTION OF SECURITY	
Inter-dependence	Eat or be eaten.

Point of departure

Two World-Views: Peacebuilding and Pacification
Source: Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS),
Review 41, December 2009

1.3   BASIC SOCIETAL CONDITIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE

While Cynthia Cockburn and Diana Francis address the practice of the peace move-
ments and conflict transformation in the context of a feminist analysis of society, phi-
losopher Judith Butler examined societal power structures and the basic conditions
for war and peace. She assumes that we think and act within certain frames, which
are the result of power oriented strategies. It is within the context of these frames that
we perceive the lives of others as being destroyed or damaged – or not. Since any
limit also includes breaks, the opportunity exists to shift these frames and to raise the
question of how our limits of perception can be shifted, for "to say that a life is inju-
rable, for instance, or that it can be lost, destroyed, or systematically neglected to the
point of death, is to underscore not only the finitude of a life (that death is certain), but
also its precariousness (that life requires various social and economic conditions to be
met in order to be sustained as a life). Precariousness implies living socially, that is,
the fact that one's life is always in some sense in the hands of the other." (Butler,
Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? 2009, pp. 13-14). "Simply put, life requires
support and enabling conditions in order to be liveable life." (ibid., p. 21). Butler dis-
tinguishes precariousness and precarity, and points out: "Lives are by definition pre-
carious: they can be expunged at will or by accident; their persistence is in no sense
guaranteed. In some sense, this is a feature of all life, and there is no thinking of life
that is not precarious – except, of course, in fantasy, and in military fantasies in par-
ticular. … Precarity designates that politically induced condition in which certain
populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become
differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death." (ibid., p. 25). For Butler, recog-
nizing precariousness as a basic fact of human life is a prerequisite for developing
empathy for the suffering of others. "For populations to become grievable does not
require that we come to know the singularity of every person who is at risk or who
has, indeed, already been risked. Rather, it means that policy needs to understand
precariousness as a shared condition, and precarity is the politically induced condition
that would deny equal exposure through the radically unequal distribution of wealth
and the differential ways of exposing certain populations, racially and nationally con-
ceptualized, to greater violence. The recognition of shared precariousness introduces
strong normative commitments of the quality and invites a more robust and universal-
izing of rights that seeks to address basic human needs for food, shelter, and other
conditions for persisting and flourishing." (ibid., pp. 28-9). This right, she says, is uni-
versal. In the wars currently being fought however, human lives are separated into
those "whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and [those]
whose lives are considered non-grievable … that cannot be mourned because [they]
never lived, … never counted as a life at all." (ibid., p. 38). The reason why we have
no right to destroy the other is due to our subjective nature, which binds us as a sub-
ject to each other subject, as well as the realization "that we each have the power to
destroy and to be destroyed, and that we are bound to one another in this power and
this precariousness." (ibid., p. 43).

Butler argues for radical rethinking of nonviolence. Nonetheless: "Violence and non-violence are not only strategies or tactics, but form the subject and become its constitutive possibilities." (ibid., p. 165). And: "Non-violence … denotes the mired and conflicted position of a subject who is injured, rageful, disposed to violent retribution and nevertheless struggles against that action." (ibid., p. 171). For Butler, "non-violence is not a peaceful state, but a social and political struggle to make a rage articulate and effective – the carefully crafted 'fuck you'." (ibid., p. 182).

But move reflects societal power structures with reference to the war-making capability of our societies, just as feminist peace researchers and activists insist that the social gender constructs of patriarchy are an essential factor for training society for war-making capability. in order to develop the peace capability of a society, it is necessary – and this is where it transcends the classical woman centred approaches – that the threat to human life as a fundamental fact be recognized, a threat which cannot be countered by armaments, walling oneself in, or heroism, since only the recognition of that fact as a basic fact of human existence makes it possible to comprehend "the radically egalitarian character of grievability" (ibid., p. 183) – and thus to permit the opportunity of a change of society towards peace capability and reconciliation.

Butler's philosophical approach forms a matrix on the basis of which concrete analyses and options for action can be organized in new frames, and an extended democratic practice for the development of peace capability can be motivated.

2 THE WORKING APPROACH OF THE PROJECT

The selection for the first phase of the project, planned for three years, was limited to the four cases mentioned above, in order to enable a relatively intensive in-depth process. The working languages were English and French, and to some extent German (none of the working languages is the mother tongue of any of the experts). The team of experts consists of:

- Shukria Dini (Toronto/Somalia) assumed responsibility for the presentation of Somalia
- Yolande Mukagasana (Brussels/Kigali) the same for Rwanda
- Bosiljka Schedlich (Berlin/Croatia) worked on ex-Yugoslavia
- Molly Malekar (Jerusalem) reported on peace work in Israel
- Lama Hourani (Ramallah) worked on the history of resistance in Palestine
- Ghada Al-Jabda (Gaza) reported about initiatives in Gaza
- Simone Susskind reported on the history of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian peace activists and on the International Women's Committee.

The first work step was to build the cooperation between the experts. Based on the basic question of susceptibility and significance of the peace work achieved by women in conflict and war areas, a working context was initiated.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
PROJECT REPORT, 2011

In order to facilitate cooperation between the experts, they provided information about their personal experiences and their access to peace work in biographical individual interviews (see Appendix 1). These interviews were then circulated among the experts, and they were able to get an impression of their cooperation partners prior to getting to know them personally.

In the second work step, key questions for country reports were formulated. The experts were requested to take a position on the history of the development of the conflicts, the course of the conflicts, civil resistance, particularly that of women, and on experiences of violence and strategies for solution and for addressing the violence of the war. The key questions (see Appendix 2) were formulated simply as incentives for the flow of the account, and not as questions to be answered strictly. Due to the difference of the concrete conflict/wartime experiences, each expert concentrated on a different aspect.

In the third work step, the experts drafted country reports, which were then translated into the other working languages and circulated. Then each expert was allowed to choose which key question she wanted to address in her report.

In the fourth work step, the working seminars in Brussels were organized. Into seminars of several days each in 2010 and 2011, the reports were discussed, and the recommendations for sensitizing policy were drafted.

In addition, two pilot seminars on the Middle East conflict were designed in Brussels, the results of which were also incorporated into the recommendations of the project. An initial pilot seminar on the history of cooperation between peace activists of Israel and Palestine is 1988 was organized in the spring of 2010 in cooperation with the EU Commission (DG Research). Activists, peace researchers, experts in the EU Commission, and politicians from the European Parliament participated in the discussion around the failure of the attempts to bring peace to the Middle East conflict and the consequences of that fact for civil society peace initiatives Israel and Palestine. In the spring of 2011, in cooperation with the UNWRA office in Brussels, the visit of a group of activists to Gaza was organized, in which the work of the women's initiatives of the UNWRA in Gaza and their civil society significance could be discussed.

In the fifth work step, the knowledge obtained in the project was considered and compiled, and presented to the closing conference of the first phase of the project in November 2011 in Brussels.

3   THE ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY REPORTS

In the analysis of country reports, we refer to the categorization established in feminist peace research, taking particular account of:

- economic
- ethno-nationalist, and
- religious

contexts of development, and the process and solution of conflicts.

For the examples we selected however, we also had to incorporate additional categories into the analysis, in particular:

- post-colonial
- post-socialist, and
- imperial geostrategic interest driven

Conflicts and war developments: Especially in Africa, post-colonial structures are still dominant, both as regards internal conflicts, and through the presence of former colonial powers which repeatedly see themselves called upon to intervene in conflicts up to the point of military intervention. This is particularly true of France.

The extent to which the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a geostrategic superpower has accelerated the outbreak of regional and intra-societal violence, conflicts and wars, or promoted geo-strategically based wars by the United States and its allies worldwide, is not to be addressed here. Particularly however with regard to the Middle East conflict, these changes have to be taken into account. Here, an unholy alliance between the power interests of the West and the conservative regimes of the region has become obvious, on alliance which undermines any possible peace process in favour of an iron military security doctrine.

What is clear in the case of Yugoslavia however is that the end of the Yalta system has promoted the development of war. To that extent therefore, it would appear appropriate to incorporate the changes and conflicts and post-socialist societies into the analysis. Bosiljka Schedlich has said in this regard: "In former Yugoslavia…, as in all post-socialist countries, a vacuum in terms of key values occurred after the political change, so that in times of crisis, people gathered around such firm identities and values as a nation and the family. Only once the crisis ends can new creations and values be installed." (Schedlich, p. 90 of the Documentation).

But we have also had to examine more closely from the point of view of geostrategic power relationships, and to call into question, the theory often voiced in feminist positions that the more patriarchal a society is, the more it tends toward violence. We can certainly be stated that Western societies have endeavored to move toward societal equality of women, and no one would certainly claim that the USA is an extremely patriarchal society. At the same time however, the US – and their allies – pursue geo-strategic imperial interests, and wage wars wherever they consider it advantageous to

do so. We must also state that the internal condition of a society – whether more or less patriarchal – only to a limited degree reflects the power interests being realized through war and violence. Formulated drastically, it could be said that imperial interests overlay domestic civil society and gender oriented democratic participation processes, and shape them to conformity with power interests. This occurred in particular in the beginning of the Afghanistan War, which was partially legitimated by the argument that the goal was the liberation of Afghan women from the extreme rule of the Taliban.

In the following, we have compiled the official statements from the country reports in the three key dimensions of the project, which are:

- the development of conflicts/wars
- civilian resistance work
- the work of peace-building

3.1   THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

> "I am convinced that this war need not have been; that wars need not to beat all. There were alternatives, as there are in every conflict, even though much of history remains alive in the present. People are different, always. - But is that a reason to wage wars?" (Bosiljka Schedlich, Doku p. 41).

In her report, Bosiljka Schedlich provides deep Insight into the fissured history of the Balkans. The following compilation contains some of the key elements of the report. The entire report is attached as Annex 1.

The history of Yugoslavia has been marked by imperial conflicts, starting with that between the Eastern and Western Roman empires, and later between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. It has also been torn apart by ethnic and religious conflicts. In the fourteenth century, the Ottomans introduced Islam into their area of rule, while the areas subordinate to the Habsburgs were Catholic, and the Serbian areas remained attached to the Byzantine tradition of Orthodox Christianity. In the nineteenth century, nationalism emerged in Croatia and Serbia, giving rise to powerful movements for independence. After the fall of the Habsburg Empire in the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes was created in 1918. The Croats and Serbs wage a continual battle over their historic justifications and their national identities, while other elements of the population were ignored. "In the discussion about territorial claims, the right of national self-determination was frequently projected into the past. In the minds of the nationalists, the nations had already existed in their respective medieval kingdoms. They derived their territorial claims from pre-Ottoman times, and demanded the restoration of their historic rights." (Doku, p. 46).

After Yugoslavia entered the Second World War at the side of Germany and Japan in 1941, Croatian nationalists proclaimed an independent state and, at Hitler's instructions, murdered the Jewish and Roma population. Thereafter, according to the plan, a third of the Serbian population of Croatia, especially the men, were to be murdered, a

third was to be deported, and the remaining third, primarily women and children, was to be converted to Catholicism. But the royalist Serbs, too, committed massacres against the Croatian and Muslim populations. The Croatian Serbian war which took place during this period was carried out with great brutality on both sides.

In accordance with a resolution of the Comintern, which wanted to tie up the German army in the Balkans, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1941 organized the resistance against the Germans. "The Communists propagated equal rights for all peoples and also federalism; they were disciplined, and introduced strict ethical and moral rules, and unlike their opponents, respected the property of the people. This won them the confidence of the people, who frequently sought refuge with the partisans, as they fled from the attacks by the nationalistic units." (Doku, p. 50). The Partisan movement under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito liberated Yugoslavia, which in 1945 became a communist, federal state. Bosiljka Schedlich notes, summarizing the country's history prior to 1989: "Yugoslavia was a conglomeration of several nations, languages, cultures and religions. It has been heir to four different cultural/civilizational realms: the Byzantine, the Mediterranean, the Central European and the Islamic. ... During the Second World War, the country also experienced a brutal civil war alongside the struggle for liberation. During the forty-six years thereafter, Yugoslavia was Stalinist for seven years and then grew from a centralist state to the most open socialist state that ever existed. Thus, Yugoslavia experienced capitalism and communism, fascism, occupation and civil war." (Doku, p. 77).

The Yugoslav and European public did not realize how the situation began to change in 1981, after Tito's death. Bosiljka Schedlich gives a precise account of the events in her report: "...Students in Prishtina demonstrated for better food at the university canteen. Workers all over Kosovo joined them, and demanded higher wages. The police shot into the demonstration and killed thirteen people. The persecution, arrests and torture of Albanians became an everyday occurrence, they were dismissed from all important positions, and their children expelled from the schools, since they were no longer allowed to speak Albanian. The deaths in Kosovo aroused no indignation in the country. In the national pecking order in Yugoslavia, … Albanians were just one rung above the Roma." (Doku, p. 60).

A memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art in 1986 accused the "Titoist regime of being anti-Serbian and of having prevented a Serbian state within the federation, of having suppressed Serbia politically and economically, and of having thrust Serbia into a subordinate role. Claiming that Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia were threatened and forced to emigrate or assimilate, they urgently demanded intervention to protect their cultural and national integrity. ...now, they said, Titoist Yugoslavia was a prison only for the Serbian people. The supporters of the Greater Serbian idea put heavy pressure on the Serbian and Yugoslav leaderships to get tough with the Albanians in Kosovo. Kosovo was pronounced the issue determining the survival and destiny of the Serbian people ... In March 1989 ... the Serbian constitution was changed and placed above the Yugoslav constitution. With this act, Serbia in effect seceded

and withdrew from the Yugoslav state. Unfortunately, the act and its implications were taken seriously neither in Yugoslavia nor abroad." (Doku, pp. 61-62).

When the Albanians in Kosovo protested against these changes in the autonomy of their province by Serbia, they were fired upon, and 22 people were killed. In June 1989, 2 million people gathered on the Kosovo Polje ("field of the blackbirds") to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the lost battle of Kosovo. "In his speech, Milosevic announced that Serbs were once again fighting a battle – without weapons, although that was not precluded. This remark too was not taken seriously, it provoked no reactions." (Doku, p. 62).

In 1990, the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia was radicalized. "Virtually all Serbs considered the elections in Slovenia as the Slovenian secession from Yugoslavia and those in Croatia as the triumph of the Ustaša [the wartime Croatian fascist party]. The results were used as a message and a call to the masses to continue the national struggle, even with weapons."

However, the war and its justification in nationalisms unfolded in the context of an existential economic crisis. "The 2700 percent inflation rate before the outbreak of the war in 1991 – like that in Europe during the 1920s – threatened people's very livelihoods, especially in the larger towns. There were reports of people who killed themselves because they were hungry and couldn't pay their electricity bills. In this situation, the interest in the preservation of the state was lost.

"The media had a major part in this, interpreting and disseminating the daily news in national terms. Anti-nationalism was discredited as the inheritance of the socialist regime, and Tito demonized as a 'totalitarian Bolshevik' by the Croatian and Serbian national leaders alike. A new culture of memory was to be forged, nationalism rehabilitated and antifascism called into question. In Serbia, the Četniks were celebrated as anti-fascists, and in Croatia, the Ustaša were revered as heroes and defenders of their people. This process was underpinned by the disclosure of the covered-up crimes of the communist government at the end of the Second World War. To spread hatred and panic, Serb nationalists used the memory of the Jasenovac extermination camp, where the Croatian Ustaša had killed thousands of Jews, Roma, Serbs and anti-fascists. The Croatian nationalists used the memory of Bleiburg, where partisans had killed thousands of their opponents after the British had prevented their flight to the west. Like a boomerang, the suppressed stories returned and fostered the thirst for revenge.

"The ideational connection which had arisen as 'fraternity and unity' in the common partisan movement, the link connecting the Yugoslav peoples which transcended all historical and everyday barriers, was thus broken. The last threads broke when the same massacred corpse was shown at the same time on the television news in Belgrade and in Zagreb – as the victim of Croats and of Serbs, respectively. Planned murders, often of moderate, peace-oriented and sensible people, spread fear which grew into panic. The tension produced the feeling of having to defend oneself and one's own people, as the partisans and the other earlier heroes had done. In coloured

uniforms obtained from a variety of modern armies and adorned with Četnik and Ustaša decorations, the insanity of the civil war within the Second World War era was revived. The calls to 'defend hearth and home' returned as the terror, the suppressed, the unspoken, to the new generation. And the nerves of the people were stretched to the breaking point." (Doku, pp. 68-69)

The reality of war finally shocked public opinion throughout Europe. Bosiljka Schedlich's report recalls the atrocities of this war up through the Dayton agreement., And asks: "The key question however is, who wanted the war and who was forced into it. The Yugoslav people believed until the end that there would be no war – and that if there were, then only where both sides wanted it. Everyone ignored Kosovo and the Albanians. In the case of Slovenia, everyone was horrified. In the case of Croatia, everyone thought it must have something to do with the Ustaša. When the shooting started in Bosnia, people thought it only involved the people in the burning neighbouring village. Only when their own village burned did they realize that the armed paramilitary units and the army were waging war against the civilian population. When people were picked up, they thought they themselves were blameless, and would soon be let free. When they were taken to the camps, tortured and killed by the thousands, they couldn't think any more. The people in Sarajevo thought they were part of the civilized world, which had hosted the Olympic Games in 1988 with great success, and that they were actually a good example of Christians and Muslims living together. They lost their faith in humanity and their hope when they were besieged, shelled and shot at from the surrounding mountains for over three years. The snipers got DM 100 for each person shot, for each dead child, for each dead woman, for each dead man, regardless of nationality. The free world could be reached only through a narrow tunnel which was dug under the airfield. Anyone trying to escape from the city was shot by the UNO soldiers, who proclaimed their neutrality. In the other cities too, the non-Serbian population was to be bled to death and driven out by starvation. In 1993, when more than fifty-one thousand people were driven together in Srebrenica by the "ethnic cleansing" of eastern Bosnia, the French General Philippe Morillon promised desperate women preventing him from leaving town that the UNO would defend Srebrenica from further attacks as a protected zone. Two years later, after they had been left to endure starvation and constant shelling, UN soldiers stood idly by as the greatest massacre in Europe since the Second World War was carried out.

"Shortly thereafter, Serbian officers left the Croatian Krajina with their families and their property, the border area. Two weeks later, some two hundred thousand Serbs fled before Operation Storm. For the USA, it was important after the massacre in Srebrenica in July 1995 to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. Since they themselves did not want to intervene militarily any more than their NATO allies did, somebody else had to do it. That somebody was Croatia, which received strategic assistance from the USA for that purpose. The Croatian armed forces expanded their operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina so far that the USA had to forbid them from taking the city of Banja Luka, which had already

been deserted by its residents, to prevent a possible humanitarian catastrophe. Thus was the Serbian Republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina maintained, so as to establish a balance of forces." (Doku pp. 72-74)

The situation of women in socialist Yugoslavia was relatively good. "...Many women completed their education. Although housework and hence the double burden, remained exclusively their responsibility, many women climbed to the highest levels in politics, the economy and culture. Before the war of the 1990s, women were amongst the best journalists, writers and politicians." (Doku, p. 81)

With the war, this situation changed radically. "They were not only expelled, shot and tortured, they were also raped on a massive scale. The rapists explained that they actually wanted to humiliate their husbands by violating their women, so that they would never again return to their homes. The 'ethnic cleansing' was to be achieved by means of violence against women." (p. 81)

"Major Yugoslav resistance against the war was impossible, due to the lack of any party or other opposition. In a country in which the partisans were the great models, and which maintained an armed defence against foreign attackers in which all adult citizens were involved, there was little chance for non-violent resistance by the citizens. Nonetheless, even during the periods of the worst fighting, there were in all parts of the country and in all societal strata people with the courage and the silent solidarity for those affected who, alone or in groups, provided help and peaceful resistance. " (p. 85).

"An appeal by mothers of soldiers was signed by 64,000 citizens of Zagreb in the course of just two days. It remained unanswered. In the summer of 1991, thousands of women demonstrated in Belgrade, and were dispersed by the soldiers. In the spring of 1992, a major demonstration was held in Sarajevo; snipers shooting a high-rise building killed eight [demonstrators]." (Doku. p. 81).

"The feminist movement arose as early as the 1970s and '80s as a common movement in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade and Sarajevo. Ties and friendships created at that time have lasted to this day. Women have been the first to use their old networks for communication with other women from other nationalities and countries. That helped to keep them from adopting the prejudices and nationalist stereotypes subconsciously themselves, and enabled them to ward off the propaganda. Such women as Biljana Kašić, Nadežda Čačinovič, Rada Iveković, Vesna Pusić, Jelena Zuppe, Vesna Kesić, Lydia Sklevicky, Maja Miles, Slavenka Drakulić and Djurdja Knežević built up the first feminist work in Yugoslavia and organized the first women's groups, ecological associations and hotlines for woman victims of violence. The war did not end their cooperation with their connections. Rather, they were the first to organize support for the victims of war and to speak out against prejudice, nationalism and war. They were attacked, threatened and labelled as 'witches'". (Doku., pp. 89-90 dt.)

The Court of Human Rights in The Hague is the primary framework within which the aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia is being dealt with, but this is also being done in the context of such civil society organizations as the regional network RECOM,

founded in 2006, in which NGOs and associations of war victims from all regions work together. The major goal of RECOM is to set up an independent commission to investigate and solve the crimes carried out during the war.

Currently, the pressure which the European Union is putting on Croatia and Serbia in the context of negotiations for accession is important. The economic situation of people is much worse than it was before the war, and this process of rapprochement shows how important it is that economic and structural support from the outside also be used for dealing with the war crimes.

The Southeast European Cultural Centre, founded in Berlin in 1991 by Bosiljka Schedlich, was a contact point for refugees from all over Yugoslavia, of which 45,000 live in Berlin alone. It has established its own network for counselling, self-help and therapeutic trauma work. In the foundation *ÜBERBRÜCKEN* (bridging), the experiences of the Centre are Incorporated into international work for overcoming the effects of war, as the precondition for the process of peace-building. Bosiljka Schedlich sums of her experience as follows: "Personally dealing with one's experiences from the war means not only ending the nightmares, but also developing trust in human society. Indeed, this is the basic precondition for process from which personal and societal capacity for peace and nonviolence can emerge. This is true both for the victims and for the perpetrators." (Doku, p. 96 dt.).

CONTEMPLATING THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA

The disintegration and war in Yugoslavia is of particular importance for Europe. First, because Europe – and particularly the EU – fell into a state of shock when faced with this war, and became incapable of action; second, because the development of the conflict and of the war in Yugoslavia certainly provide a scenario for what can happen if the EU were to fall apart. Yugoslavia was a multiethnic state, a leader of the so-called neutral nations during the Cold War, a model of far-reaching federalism, and the model for democratic and non-authoritarian socialism, and hence was for a long time an example for development in other countries. None of this did any good when it came to preventing them insanity of war. The essential lesson for Europe from the Yugoslav war is that historic conflicts can break out anew at any time, and that war can returned to central Europe.

The first violent conflicts, the students and workers strike in Kosovo, began in 1981. For 10 years, until the outbreak of the war, the nationalist and ethnic conflicts developed before the eyes of the Yugoslav and European public without anybody taking any notice. The outbreak in the course of the war ultimately took place in the shadow of the upheaval in Europe in 1989, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nonetheless, the fact that the development of the conflict was not perceived at all is unique, and requires deeper reflection, beyond the scope of the present project.

The composition of Yugoslavia after the Second World War, with six republics and two autonomous provinces, with various nationalities and religions, had after all stuck together for 35 years until Tito's death, passing through various reform processes. The transformation from a kind of socialism that was in no sense Stalinist, and was

marked by a high degree of citizens' participation, to capitalism, took place here very much earlier, at the beginning of the 1980s. Notably, there were two groups of the population which suffered discrimination here: the Albanians of the Roma. It is also notable that the Serbs always saw themselves as the winners of the Second World War, and long before the development of the violent conflicts, claimed predominance over Croatia and Slovenia.

There are existential economic crises to be overcome: the famine after 1945, Stalin's economic blockade in 1948, the industrialization of the country, and the struggle against illiteracy, which at the outset included 80% of the population, the transition from the socialist-centralist system to the Yugoslav model of worker self-management, to name but a few. The economic crises in the '60s led to an opening of the borders and to growing labour migration by Yugoslav citizens, who, with their transfer payments, contributed to a great degree to the survival of the country, right up until the outbreak of the war. In 1983, reforms were adopted for the economic consolidation of the country, but they could not be implemented because each republic and province was fighting for its own particular interests. In this case, it is clear that at ethno-nationalism and economic interests of domination were closely connected.

All this does not however explain how such an incredible outbreak of hate and violence, and genocide against the Muslim population, could occur. In order to find even the beginnings of an explanation, the change in the interpretation of history would have to be examined more closely. The common Yugoslav identity rested on the history of resistance against Hitler and the liberation of the country by the partisans. Under the surface of this common identity and its great historical narrative, there was evidently the history of a bitter and violent nationalism, especially of the Croats and Serbs, before and after the First World War. This nationalism in turn overlaid the history of Habsburg rule, and the struggles against the Ottoman Empire. And perpendicular to these historical data, which can be ever updated and reinterpreted, run the boundaries between the religions: Islam, Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Particularly in the Christian churches – unlike among the Muslims – the development of the conflicts have proven to be incapable of peaceful resolution, by supporting the particularly prevailing ethno-nationalistic tendencies. An examination of the development of the ideological training of the population for war reveals a number of distinct phases of the country's development:

- The discrimination and the growing racism against the Albanian and Roma population groups are an indicator for the incapability of Yugoslav societies, long before the outbreak of hostilities between other population groups, to realize the legally rooted equality and participation of various population groups.
- Long past historical dates, such as the battle of Kosovo, are recalled and documented in the media, and thus linked to current patterns of interpretation.
- Economic problems are no longer seen as common problems, but rather in the context of the strong and the weak: The strong no longer want to share with

the weak; at the same time, the weak suffer discrimination justified by their supposed incompetence.

- Neighbours become enemies: From a certain point on, enmity starts is no longer restricted to the public realm, far removed from the real relationships between people, but is rather lived at the individual level.
- The new patterns of interpretation in the new national identities demand defending oneself against one's respective enemy. No one sees himself as the aggressor, but rather as the defender of his own well understood national interests.
- No party to the war can do without legitimating ideological contexts. Fighting for justice for one's own cause is part of the self-legitimation of war propaganda.

The fact that women were well integrated in Yugoslav society did not contribute to the peace capability of Yugoslavia's component societies. Yet women's self-help groups attempted to make European and Yugoslav public opinion aware of the possible developments toward war – albeit without success. Moreover, many women's groups refused to let themselves be split apart along nationalistic lines, but continued to maintain contact during and after the war, and organized self-help projects for peace-building. Thanks to this work, the victims of rape and mistreatment gained the courage to publicly describe their experiences before the Court in The Hague, and thus to contribute toward the condemnation of sexual violence in conflicts and wars as a war crime by the UN.

Only when the massacre of Muslim men from Srebrenica became known, and only after, in the spring of 1995, a shell killed eighty young people in a disco in Sarajevo, was international public opinion ready to accept military intervention. That was the only way this insanity could have been stopped at that point. Yet that would have been possible long before 1989, and even until long after the war had started. It would have been possible to alleviate the economic difficulties by cooperation. It would also have been possible to address the perhaps unstoppable process of secession, and thus to control it, so as to prevent a war of everybody against everybody. But all this is speculation with no basis in reality.

The result of this war is the breakup of former Yugoslavia into new small nation-states, and ethnic cleansing. Ethno-nationalism is still massively present. While Bosnia-Herzegovina has formally been preserved as a unit, it is in fact split into Serbian and Croatian-Bosnian parts. Kosovo is still a trouble spot. Many refugees have been unable to return to their homes, due to the ethnic cleansing. The wounds of war are still festering, even 16 years after the end of the fighting.

Peace work during the war and since the end of the fighting has been concentrated on re-establishing the dignity of people by means of trauma work and many at least small projects for the reestablishment of an acceptable socio-cultural climate. Of particular importance is the work of the international Court of Justice in The Hague. The legal proceedings against those responsible for the war are important; so, too, is the identification of those murdered at Srebrenica, so that the survivors can carry out a

mourning process. Being able to mourn is the basis for healing the wounds of war – as is the acceptance of guilt and of its consequences.

We can draw many lessons from the war in Yugoslavia:

1. Conflicts and wars can break out in the shadow of upheavals in interregional and global power relationships.
2. Ethno-nationalism can lead to civil war in the middle of Europe, and anywhere in the world; no country is immune to it. For this reason, particular vigilance is necessary. Ethnic homogeneity is the reactionary myth that justifies violence.
3. War does not solve a single societal problem. The social structures of all societies are conflict laden. The key is to find strategies for solutions which do not end in destruction and war. Violent conflicts and wars all have long pre-histories. Knowledge of the danger must become engraved in the consciousness of the international community.
4. Information about the worsening conflicts and the changes of public opinion in the process of ideological preparation of war are not perceived or made public at an early stage, either by the international or by the domestic public, or even by the diplomatic representatives in the countries involved. That information comes from civil society groups and women's initiatives, which have a high degree of sensitivity for the worsening of violent relationships. To note this and take it seriously would be an important first step.
5. The development of an early warning system of conflict observation from the local to the national and on to the international level is absolutely necessary.
6. The interrelationship between economic difficulties and the development of violent conflicts is obvious. In international and interregional strategy and aid for economic stabilization could therefore contribute toward reducing conflict potential.
7. Considerable peace dividends during the war and after the end of fighting is provided by those groups which do not let themselves be broken apart into friend/enemy categories, and do not permit themselves to be corrupted, and which are socially rooted, and can act as honest mediators. Civil resistance work is of inestimable value for the development of peace capabilities. The work of women is of extraordinary importance here.
8. Developing peace capability is a long and difficult process. It needs all the support it can get. Without such a process of development of peace capability, experiences of violence, often from the distant past, continue to fester. In this way, victims can become perpetrators, and the cycle of violence will never be broken.

3.2   THE CASE OF SOMALIA

> "The road to peace for Somalia seems uncertain at this time. However, ordinary Somalis, whether living inside or outside Somalia, are fed up with this senseless violence. They want peace, stability and a state." (Shukria Dini)

Somalia has been a failed state for the last two decades. In its recent history, the country has been marked by colonial and post-colonial conflicts and wars. Even the constellation of power of the Cold War and the historic upheaval after 1989 significantly affected the history of conflict in the country.

After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the region attracted the interest of the colonial powers. Initially, Britain and France shared control of the region; Italy joined them later. In 1960, the British and Italian areas became independent, while French-ruled Djibouti achieved separate independence later. The period from 1960 to 1969 is called the Democratic Period; it was followed by a period of military rule, lasting from 1969 to 1991. Since 1993, Somalia has been considered a failed state.

Shukria Dini starts her report with a description of the results of colonialism: "Before the time of colonial rule, the Somalis relied on a pastoral-traditional governance system to govern their affairs. Men were, and still are, the leaders and members of this government; women are only represented. ... The colonial system was in contradiction to the traditional decentralized system of government which Somalis had exercised." (Doku p. 101). Colonialism led to the emergence of a new colonial Somali elite which competed with the traditional leadership for power. Mistrust, jealousy, and conflicts between clans and social classes were engendered by the colonial system, and remain deeply rooted to this day. "The Somali local leaders, who became the leaders of the nation, merely took over from their colonial rulers; they did not change the practices of the former colonial powers." (Doku, S. 102).

Since its independence, Somalia has been tied to the interests of its former colonial powers and the two Cold War superpowers. The military regime was supported both by the USSR and by the USA, especially with military aid, which helped feed the war with Ethiopia in the Ogaden region during the 1970s. However, it lost the support of Cuba and the USSR. "The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia led to death, destruction, the displacement of ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia, and to lasting enmity between the two countries." (Doku p. 105). After this war, a militant opposition arose in Somalia, but it was crushed by the military regime. Unfortunately, the militarized violence at the beginning of the 1990s was perceived by the international community only as an internal struggle between local clans. It was not until the international aid organizations withdrew from the country as a result of the violence, and TV images of dying Somali children were broadcasted throughout the Western world, that the UN Security Council address the issue of Somalia and pass a number of resolutions. In 1992, a military peace mission was carried out in Somalia under the leadership of the US, to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid. At the same time, an attempt was made to move toward peace between the parties to the violent conflict, and to

achieve their disarmament. This caused several of the warlords to turn their weapons against the international troops and the US military. In 1994, the US withdrew from Somalia, the troops of other countries followed suit, and Somalia was left to its own devices once again. "From 1994 to 2006, Somalia remained a stateless nation run by violent warlords and their militias. From the early 1990s until 2008, the international community sponsored sixteen peace/reconciliation conferences. All of these international efforts, including the peace processes, failed to solve the political problems of Somalia. They failed because the processes were not Somali owned." (Doku, p. 109).

In 2004, following one of the peace conferences in Kenya, the "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG) was formed to create peace. At the same time, however, the TFG found itself in opposition, particularly, to the religious opposition of the United Islamic Courts (UIC), which was successfully able to win the support of the people, and introduce Islamic law. The UIC succeeded in reducing the power of the warlords. "Due to the stability and order created by the UIC, many Somalis in the diaspora returned to Mogadishu, and were able to get their property back ... The era led by the UIC was a promising period that offered alternative solutions to Somalia's protracted anarchy through some sort of governance, based on Sharia law, that sought to oust the warlords, protect civilians from violence, and bring law and order in the capital city and beyond." (p. 110). In 2006 however, Ethiopian troops intervened militarily and ended the predominance of the UIC. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia led to new waves of deadly violence, destruction and flight. However, they also made it possible for the TFG to establish itself in Mogadishu in 2007. Shukria Dini divides the development of violence into four phases:

"The first stage is what I call *the era of warlords vs. the military government*. During this stage, in the first half of the 1990s, the armed opposition was organized on a clan basis, and the warlords, the leaders of the military opposition movement, waged war against Siad Barre's military government. This stage was the bloodiest of all the stages of militarized violence. Both warring groups used extreme violence against one another. Siad Barre's government was toppled in January 1990 by the warlord-led opposition. They and their armed militias carried out indiscriminate killings, lootings and destruction of property, as well as violence against women.

"This was followed by a second stage, lasting until the end of 1990s, which I call *the era of warlords against civilians,* during which the warlords and their armed militias controlled the country. During this period of lawlessness, statelessness and anarchy, a political vacuum emerged, in which the warlords waged deliberate violence and terror against civilians, including women. They saw the targeted civilians as enemies who had either close relationships or clan affiliations with the military government, and thus benefited from it. The warlords and their armed militias seized or destroyed public and private property, claiming it belonged to certain individuals in the government. They also began to compete for access to resources, land control and power over the people. Violence against women and minority groups increased.

"During the third stage, which I call *the era of warlords against warlords,* warlords and their militias collided and waged deadly wars against one another, with the civil-

ian population once again caught in the middle. For example, the capital Mogadishu was clearly divided –against the wishes of its inhabitants – into two parts, North and South, each controlled by a warlord and his militia.

The fourth stage of the militarized conflict involved with 'radical religious opposition goups vs. former colleagues who labeled themselves as non-radical groups – who were the current leaders of the transitional government/international peacekeepers'.In other words, the current TFG is headed by one of the leaders of UIC, Sheikh Sharif, a religious moderate, while his former friends, including Sheikh Dahir Aweys, now oppose his administration, the international support he receives being the main cause of enmity between the two. The armed religious groups who oppose the TFG constitute the new aggressors of the Somali war – against the administration, its institutions and its overall international support, which includes the African peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi. And the civilians are caught in the crossfire between government forces supported by the AU forces on the one hand and the armed religious opposition groups on the other." (Doku pp. 117-118)

In all the areas affected by the Civil War, civilians, women and children are trapped, and directly or indirectly drawn into the conflict. However, the war affects young males most directly. "The warlords recruited them in the name of their clans, and exposed them to an extremely dangerous situation. They were given guns and *khat* to do the dirty job for the warlords. ... They continue to be the most exploited and endangered group in war-torn Somalia. With no security, state protection, livelihood or educational opportunities, young Somali men continue to be targeted by all the warring groups, and used to carry guns and serve as cheap foot soldiers and as pirates." (Doku, p. 122).

Women and children are particularly affected by the militarized violence. For over two decades due to the violence, they have been forced to flee from their homes to internally displaced camps within Somalia and refugee coamps in neighbouring countries. They have been subjected to sexual violence and rape. Warring groups used rape as a weapon of war and it was used against women and girls that belonged to the 'enemy clans'.

Nonetheless, women have committed themselves in many ways for compromise and peace-building in Somalia. Informally, women who lived in mixed-clan marriages and who have not allowed themselves to be separated by clan divisions, are often the ones who are active. In addition, they use a particular form of art in order to rally for peace.

"They also use poetry known as *buraanbur* to express their opposition to the conflict and their support for peace. Through poetry, women discuss the ways in which they have been affected by the violence, and the importance of peace, by promoting unity and solidarity across clan boundaries. Interviews with female poets in Puntland and Somaliland have revealed that poetry is used to resist violence. Female poets pressured warring groups to reconcile with each other, while other women organized and held peace rallies and prayers to avert violence and promote reconciliation, and

launched direct appeals to clan leaders and warring groups, to stop the violence. In the appeals, women made it clear to their clan leaders that they will not morally or financially support violence against another community. ... Women's efforts in averting violence and building peace enabled communities such as Puntland and Somaliland to achieve relative peace." (Doku S. 127). When North and South Mogadishu were divided in the mid-'90s, women found many creative ways to overcome the border and to meet women on the other side, "to collect information on the impact of the violence, and to deliver goods to those who were affected by the violence." (Doku, S. 127)

Of particular importance is the work of Asha Hagi Elmi, who today is one of the 40 female members of the Transitional Parliament. She received the Alternative Nobel Prize in 2008 for her work, and is involved in all processes of peace-building. Living in a mixed-clan marriage, Asha Hagi Elmi stood up against the enmity between the clans. But she went even further. In view of the lack of participation of women in the clans, Asha in 2000 declared "my only clan is womanhood", and founded the women-only Sixth Clan in response to the five traditional male-dominated Somali clans. Asha's organization, Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC), put pressure on clan elders, religious leaders, Islamic scholars and politicians to bring women to the negotiating table as equal partners and decision-makers. Asha fought for women to have a voice, but with the constant threat of violence hanging over her head, she is now based in Kenya for her own safety. SSWC supports women and girls who want to go to school and get an academic education, so that women can help design and build the future society of Somalia as lawyers, teachers, physicians and other professionals. This is her particular contribution to a peace dividend in time of war.

Shukria Dini concludes her report with the statement that there have been a number of opportunities at which it would have been possible to end the conflict, but that they have repeatedly been missed. She says that instead of addressing the roots of the conflict and the social cultural and economic facts as a point of departure for peace-building and the reconstruction of state structures, solutions on the basis of military action have always been sought. These approaches have unfortunately also been pursued by the international community – and they have always failed. She calls for an alternative peace-building approach.

1. "There is a need to move away from top-down, male-dominated and militaristic approaches, and to start relying on non-militaristic, participatory, gender-inclusive, bottom-up approaches, which will heal the deep wounds of the war and address the immediate needs of the population. (Doku, pp. 126-127).

2. "Somali women's experiences, particularly their new identities as primary providers and their important contribution to peace-building and recovery, need to be recognized, valued and supported by both national and international institutions. (Doku. p. 128)

3. "Somalia desperately needs genuine and continuous support from the international community. ... Solving the protracted conflict in Somalia will require a new mind-set and engagement which move away from a project-based and piecemeal

mentality toward a holistic, genuine and solid one, so that the scourge of the protracted violence in Somalia can be tackled successfully. The people of Somalia must also be provided with the opportunity for reconciliation. (Doku, S.129).

4. "Somalis must be at the front seat in the reconciliation process. (p. 129)
5. "If and when the guns fall silent, there will be a need to address the trauma caused by the conflict. Currently, 'forgive and forget' is being emphasized in Somalia. Forgiveness is important, but forgiveness alone will not mend the hearts of traumatized people." (Doku, p. 129).

THOUGHTS ABOUT THE CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA

The situation in Somalia remains complicated. On top of the horrors of civil war, there is now the threat of death by starvation, due to the drought and famine. However, the development of the wars does provide some lessons.

The colonial structures which were aopted by the elites in the post-colonial period remained in place. This led to a clash between the traditional power structure embodied in the clans, and the new centralistic power structure. This friction between these structures appears to be at the centre of disputes to this day.

External military intervention by the UN in order to break the cycle of violence and destruction has failed, because it was not in a position to mediate in the internal conflicts. International attention for the civil war depends on spectacular pictures – such as those from the famine – or from the overall geostrategic orientation of the United States. Military intervention by neighbouring countries is interest driven. That precludes these countries from assuming an honest broker's role.

The experience of Somalia suggests that external military interventions – regardless by whom – will be seen by some of the civil war parties as new military aggression, against which they believethey have to fight. External military interventions in Somalia have contributed to further destruction of internal structures important for peacebuilding.

The specific role of the diaspora in the Civil War has not yet been sufficiently developed in terms of its capacity for peace-building.

Evidently, the war dividends for the warlords are too lucrative that all attempts at peace-building are doomed to failure. These ware dividends must first be identified before anything can change.

To date, the women's initiative has are what have built the peace dividends. The strategy of Asha Hagi and her group is of extraordinary significance. With the formation of the Sixth Clan, the women have rooted themselves in the traditions of Somalia. At issue here is not the destruction of traditional power structures, but rather their expansion to include respect for women as partners.

The conclusion which Shukria Dinis draws is first of all that it is important to build the peace-building process on the basis of the inner strengths of Somalia, and not from the outside; and second, that the international community can help where productive

approaches for civil development in Somalia itself can be realized: infrastructure, education, health, protection for small peasants and nomads in the drought, building of administrative structures, and nation-building. These are the issues that must continue to be discussed.

3.3   THE CASE OF RWANDA

> "In Rwanda, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa always lived together as brothers prior to colonization. Certainly, there were power struggles at court, but when it came to defending the territorial integrity, the whole population rallied without distinction. Every adult male went to the front to defend the integrity of the country. Everything started with the colonial ideology, which spawned the ideology of genocide against the Tutsi." (Yolande Mukagasana)

Rwanda is not a state created by the colonial powers, but rather has a long history as an independent kingdom. The population consists of three groups, the Twa, the Hutu and Tutsi. In her report on the history of the country, Yolande Mukagasana writes: "In Rwanda, the groups Hutu, Tutsi and Twa never existed as ethnic groups. The ethnic groups were created by the imagination of the colonizers. Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were socio-economic classes." (Docu., p. 131)

The first colonial power in Rwanda was Germany, followed during the First World War by Belgium. Yolanda Mukagasana describes the process of ethnization and separation of the population groups in Rwanda by the Belgian colonial authority in stages: "In Rwanda, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa always lived together as brothers prior to the colonial period. Certainly, there were power struggles at court, but when it came to defending the territorial integrity, the whole population rallied without distinction. Every adult male went to the front to defend the integrity of the country. Everything started with the colonial ideology, which spawned the ideology of genocide against the Tutsi." (Doku p. 139)

During the 1930s, a massive program of Christianization was carried out. The Catholic Church thus became the educational institution for Rwandan children. It played a special role in virtually wiping out the traditional culture and religion of Rwanda: "The culture of Rwanda has been killed, and no people has survived the death of its culture." (Doku, p. 135). In 1959, the first Hutu massacre of Tutsis occurred in Rwanda, and many people fled to neighbouring countries. In 1961, Rwanda was proclaimed an independent state, and the Hutu majority took power. Tutsis continue to be persecuted or excluded from the life of society, and murdered. Neither at the national nor at the international level did anybody take note of the persecution of the Tutsis: "...Since killing Tutsis has become normal, nobody cares, either nationally or internationally. Nobody was ever punished for killing Tutsis between 1959 and 1994. Thirty five years of impunity. Rwanda has become the largest producer of refugees." (Doku p. 138)

THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
PROJECT REPORT, 2011

In answer to the question as to why the genocide became possible, certain socio-cultural factors must be considered. The colonial masters and the Catholic Church destroyed the identities of the people in Rwanda, and forced them to see themselves as deficient and in competition to one another. They were told that they belong to different ethnic groups, and that one ethnic group was better than the other two. They were told that they had come to Rwanda from different areas, first the Twa, then the Hutu and finally the Tutsi. "The Tutsi obtained, without their knowledge, three poisoned gifts: racial difference, racial superiority (which earned them a monopoly on power), and alien status. Hutu were relegated to the margins ... a marginalization which would lead to resentment, then to conflict and finally to the violence of 1959 that led to the genocide of 1994 ..." (Doku p. 143). In 1959, the issue of the separation into a Hutu country and a Tutsi country was raised; in 1960, the expulsion of the Tutsi from Rwanda was demanded; between 1962 and 1994, Tutsis were excluded from all important areas of society – until, in 1994, the genocide finally began. "A genealogy can be traced from the ideas of difference (affirmed by western observers) to the action of extermination (undertaken by the killers of 1994)." (Doku p. 143). The term genocide was used by the Hutu leaders starting in 1964 – that was when the idea became current. The preparation followed, and was then carried out in 1994.

Thus was the hatred of the Tutsi continually stoked until, at the beginning of the '90s, it broke out into violence. In 1991, the international community took note of the worsening conflict. Tutsi rebels attempted to force the return of refugees from Uganda; thereupon, mass arrests of Tutsis took place inside Rwanda. Of the 7887 persons arrested, 4300 were released again under international pressure. France sent troops to protect the French people living in Rwanda, and the French foreign Legion occupied the airport of Kigali. In 1993, a UN peace-keeping mission was sent to Rwanda, under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. In 1994, the Rwandan president was killed when his airplane was shot down under circumstances which are not clear. This event sparked the genocide. Between April and June 1994, according to official Rwandan statistics, 1,074,017 people were killed, primarily Tutsis, but also Hutus who oppose the killing. The French and UN troops stood by helplessly. Many people seeking protection in churches and schools were handed over to the militias by Catholic priests and teachers. The UN then reinforced its presence through a peace-enforcement mission under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter; however, these troops were seen as more of a party to the conflict than as a peace mission.

Thereafter, many people, especially the Hutu militias who have carried out the genocide, fled to surrounding countries. Since 1998, Rwandan militias have been fighting in the Second Congolese War in neighbouring Congo. Many of the simple participants have however returned to Rwanda. Since 2000, the situation in the country has settled down under President Paul Kagame. Since 2002, a process of dealing with the trauma through the Gacama courts has been taking place.

In 1992, there were thirteen women's associations in Rwanda which united under the slogan "*Pro Femmes/Toutes Ensemble*". After the genocide, this cooperation was initially destroyed, some members had been killed, while others had fled the country.

After the genocide, Rwanda had 600,000 orphans; it was the women who cared for them. Prior to the 1995 UN conference in Beijing, woman activists who had returned from exile came together. "After they had formed a common group, they decided to meet in order to get to know one another. Neither side trusted the other, due to the genocide and the dehumanization which some had undergone due to the politics of division which had reigned in Rwanda prior to the genocide. … They therefore decided to open themselves up to a culture of peace. They created a project called 'the campaign for peace'." (Doku p. 150)

The women developed many initiatives for peace and reconciliation, and they struggled to ensure that today, women play an important role in the politics of the country. "When Rwanda established the National Commission for Reconciliation, the Committee was headed by a woman. When popular Gacaca Courts were created, the majority of judges of integrity appointed were women. These are women who fought for the rights of women and children. They have a number of political associations, and all these associations are in an umbrella-group which does excellent work – ultimately, for Rwanda. Thanks to women, there is now collaboration between the police and the women's associations in Rwanda against violence against women in couples and households." (Doku, p. 149). Moreover, more than half the members of the Rwandan Parliament today are women.

Today, the development of Rwanda appears to be on a good path – but especially in the diaspora, there are still people who see the return of the Tutsi to society and politics in Rwanda, if not as unacceptable, then at least as temporary. The thorn of hate has not disappeared.

CONTEMPLATION OF THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

The process of the destruction of the cohabitation of the various population groups in Rwanda continued from the great massacre in 1959 until 1994. For 35 years, and open development of hatred continued. In 1961, the destruction of the Tutsi was openly broached for the first time; nonetheless, this development was not noticed internationally.

Only starting in 1991 did the international community register the fact that serious and dangerous conflict was developing. Initially, France sent troops to Rwanda to protect its own citizens, before the UN sent a peace-keeping mission and later, during the period of the genocide a peace-enforcement mission. The dramatic failure of French and international military missions can be highlighted by two facts: the French troops and the UN peace-keeping troops watched the genocide proceed without intervening. They failed dramatically. And the UN peace-enforcement troops were seen as a party to the conflict – and were thus likewise condemned to failure.

The case of Rwanda therefore raises the fundamental question of how the possibility of various population groups living together in the same country can be made possible without repeatedly falling victim to the ideology of the superiority of one group over the other.

Rwanda has since 2000 begun to address the trauma of the genocide. The very strong presence of women in dealing with the trauma, and overall in the political re-building process of the country, is a sign of hope that a true process of reconciliation may take place in the future. But in the adjoining areas, hatred continues to smoulder, especially through the participation of Hutu militias in the Congolese War.

3.4 THE MIDDLE EAST

The war between Israel and its neighbours, and the struggle for the right of a Palestinian state to exist alongside Israel, have accompanied global politics with increasingly severe outbreaks of violence.

The conflict did not in any way begin with Resolution 181 of the UN in 1947, which provided a plan for the division of the territory of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state. Throughout the history of this area, from the mythological – and historically poorly attested – accounts of the Bible, through the expulsion of the Jewish population (likewise not attested) by the Romans in 73 and 135 CE, the conquest of Jerusalem in 638 CE by the Caliph and the construction of the Dome of the Rock in 691, the Crusades and the temporary rule of the area by the Crusaders, the area has been the subject and object of war and conquest. Only the period of Ottoman rule of the region from 1516 to 1917 seems to have been more or less peaceful.

At the end of the 19th century, when Jewish immigration began, there were only about half a million people in the area, 90% of whom were Muslims, so that only a few tens of thousands of Jews and Christians lived in Palestine.

After the British victory in the First World War over the Ottoman Empire, the area was divided between Britain and France, under a system of "mandates", which included the promise of independence over the medium term. At that time, France occupied Lebanon and Syria, and Britain got all of Palestine – including modern Jordan – and Iraq; the mandate was issued in 1922. In 1917 however, Britain had, in the Balfour Declaration, pronounced itself in favour of founding a national homeland for the Jewish people – albeit with the express statement that this could not be carried out in a way injurious to the rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; moreover, similar promises had been made to the Arabs as well. When the mandate was issued, Britain determined that the area west of the Jordan river be provided for settlement by the Jewish people, and that east of the Jordan would become an Arab emirate. The promise made to the Arabs of independence was thus broken, so that the battle for Palestine began anew, for the Arab side was in no way prepared to tolerate Jewish immigration and the creation of a Jewish state. Thus did the conflict begin; its origins go much further back into history than 1948, when the Israeli state was proclaimed against the wishes of the British and the Arabs.

Jewish immigration into Palestine in large numbers began at the end of the 19th century, and involved the purchase of land. The pogroms against Jews in eastern Europe, and the idea of Zionism motivated many Jews to emigrate to Palestine. Starting in 1919, there were violent uprisings by the Arab population against Jewish immigra-

tion, leading, after the rebellion of 1936 in 1939, to a complete ban on Jewish immigration. This again led to militant attacks by Jewish underground organizations against British facilities. The rest is part of the 60 year struggle between two nations for one country.

The basis for the current 60-year conflict is UN Resolution 181 of 1947, which awarded the Jewish population 55% of the entire country, and only 45% to the Arab population, with a special status for Jerusalem. With the foundation of the state of Israel and the Palestinian War of 1948, Israel expanded territory its even beyond that amount. With the Six-Day War of 1967 in the occupation of Sinai, Gaza, Sinai, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, with the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the wars against Lebanon in 1982 and 2006 as well as, finally, the war against Gaza in 2008, Israel has expanded its military power in the region and occupied all Palestinian territories.

After the Six-Day War, the nationalist religious Israeli settlement movement in the occupied territories began, and was reinforced after 1977. It did not stop even during the time of the peace process after the Oslo Accords. Although Israel did dismantle 21 settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank in 2005, it did not generally stop the expansion of settlement construction. With the construction of the wall straight across the country, and other measures for the protection of the settlements in the occupied territories, additional confiscation of land and severe restrictions have been imposed on the Palestinian people.

The expulsion of a large part of the population of Palestine from the territory of Israel began in 1948. This first expulsion is remembered by the Palestinians as the Naqba (catastrophe). Even today, the descendents of these refugees live in refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank, and also in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The question as to what status the refugees are to receive and where they can settle is the most difficult problem to solve in the peace negotiations.

The Palestinian PLO originally demanded all of Palestine as a state for the Arab people. It fought Israel militarily, including with terrorist attacks. Only in 1974 did the Palestine National Council change its demand and call for a common state of the Jewish and Arab populations, which however would have an Arab majority. Starting in 1987, especially young people in the occupied territories launched the First Intifada, which Israel countered with brutal violence.

In the context of the global political transformation of 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the First Gulf War, the Madrid Peace Conference was convened in 1991 and ultimately led to the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995. Hopes for the development of peace were, however, not fulfilled. A further round of negotiations – Camp David II – failed. Militant action and suicide attacks by the Palestinian side, and intensive settlement construction and provocations from the Israeli side ultimately led to the Second Intifada, which was considerably more violent than the first, primarily due to the suicide bombings against the Israeli civilian population and the fact that autonomy had given the Palestinians, who had previously fought with stones, access to firearms. In

addition, primitive missiles were fired upon Israeli territory from southern Lebanon; after the Gaza Strip was evacuated by Israel, that too served as a "launching pad".

The reports by Lama Hourani about Palestine, Gahda Al-Jabda about Gaza and Molly Malekar about Israel tell very different, even contradictory stories. The are stories which might have taken place on different planets – and yet they are similar: they are stories of flight and expulsion, misery, violence and extermination.

In her very personal report, Lama Hourani expresses her range over the continual humiliation, and the constant pressure and threats imposed on the Palestinian people. Gahda Al-Jabda, Director of the UNWRA health service in Gaza, reports of that organization's many projects to provide children and young people with civil education and women with socio-cultural and economic projects in spite of the catastrophic situation that exists in Gaza. Finally, Molly Malekar recounts attempts at peace-building and cooperation within the peace movement, but also the disillusionment of Israeli peace activists in view of the hopelessness of the situation.

3.4.1 PALESTINE

> "There are no secrets in this century-long conflict; the reasons for opening and closing doors for peace are known." (Lama Hourani)

For the Palestinian people, the core issue of the conflict has never changed: "The conflict is about land and the right to existence" (Hourani, Docu p. 180). In the report by Lama Hourani, the conflict is viewed from the start as being directly in the context of aggressive Zionism and imperialist Interests. By contrast, she sees such other factors as "the retardation of the Palestinian social, political and economic structure, including gender inequality, patriarchal society and the prevailing feudal agricultural relations" (Doc, p. 178) as secondary. She says, "The alliance between imperialism and Zionism has a dual aim: the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine as a base to protect imperialistic interests in the Middle East, and the engaging of the Arab countries in a conflict that is doomed to defeat, in an attempt to deprive these countries of their natural growth, control over their own resources, and their destiny." (Docu, p. 179).

By proclaiming the land to be their property, the Zionists, "allowed themselves to commit crimes of any kind and size, and to keep the people of the land from living freely in their own land. The Palestinians, on the other hand, have justified their violent resistance as a legal action against British-Zionist, and later Israeli-American, double aggression. The violence has flared up and escalated. There have been victims every time Israel decided to expand – and has been confronted with Palestinian resistance." (Docu, p. 179) Lama Hourani does not have a particularly positive assessment of the peace process after the Oslo Accords. Nonetheless, she says, the opinion in Palestinian society during this time predominantly supported negotiations and non-violent resistance as the right way to convince Israel that international law would have to be recognized, and to win them over to a permanent political solution of the conflict. Their frustration in view of the stalled peace process and the provocations ulti-

mately led to a Second Intifada, which, according to Lama Hourani, sparked an Apartheid policy in Israel. She identifies three factors for this:

"Israel today controls more than 80% of the water resources in the West Bank, and allows Palestinian citizens to use no more than (50) cubic meters per capita a year. At the same time, the illegal Israeli settlers use more than 2400 cubic meters of water per year per capita.

"The Israeli GDP per capita averages around $26,000 per year, while the GDP per capita in Palestine is no more than $1000 per year. Yet Palestinians are obliged, because of the imposed market union and tax union, to pay the same prices for goods as Israelis. Palestinians are also obliged to buy water and electricity from Israel – for double the price that Israeli citizens pay: Palestinians pay 5 NIS per water unit, while Israelis pay 2.4 NIS; Palestinians pay 13 NIS per unit of electricity, Israelis pay 6.3 NIS.

"The system of road segregation that has been initiated by Israel, where most of the main roads in the West Bank are exclusively for Israeli settlers or the Israeli army, separates Palestinian villages and cities from each other, and restricts their access to different places and resources.

"The building of Apartheid on the occupied territories: There is a huge wall, which will extend for about 850 km when finished. It is three times as long and twice as high as the Berlin Wall used to be. And even where it is not made of concrete, it is somewhere between 60 and 104 meters wide, depriving Palestinians of vast areas of land. It is destroying the Palestinian social fabric, depriving students of the possibility of reaching their schools or universities, and depriving hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from reaching medical care or health systems. In East Jerusalem, the wall separates the Palestinians on the right side of the wall from those on the left side. Jerusalem itself is not accessible to Palestinians living in the rest of the West Bank Areas.

"The colonial settlement activities: The Israelis started building these settlements in the West Bank in the mid-1970s." (Docu p. 182).

At the same time, Lama Hourani recognizes the efforts of peace activists on both sides. "But the results of these modest efforts are less than is needed to achieve true reconciliation for a very long conflict. The persistent failure of the peace processes is reflected in this area, too. It is more difficult to achieve reconciliation if the main issues remain unresolved. Without addressing the asymmetry between the two parties, without recognizing that one party is living under daily humiliation, while the other party is trying to defend the state that is imposing this humiliation on its counterpart, and without admitting that the representative of the occupying country are calling to fight against the oppressed, rather than being in solidarity with them, the conflict will not be resolved." (Docu, p. 187). She says that fundamentally, there is no permanent political solution unless the symmetry between the parties is first address. And she concludes: "Unless Israel is obliged to accept a solution that gives the Palestinians what the UN resolutions and international law provide, the chances for peace will re-

main far away, and the doors of peace will be closed – but the doors of violence, extremism and terrorism will be opened." (Docu, p. 187)

3.4.2 SPECIAL VIEW ON GAZA

> "Years of occupation, conflict, high population density, limited land and sea access, a blockade with continuing isolation, and strict internal and external security controls have degraded the economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli-imposed crossing closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS violently took over the territory in June 2007, and Israeli military operations against Gaza during the December 2008 – January 2009 war, resulted in the near collapse of most of the private sector, extremely high unemployment, and high poverty rates." (Ghada Al-Jadba)

Ghada Al-Jadba provides a brief overview of the extreme situation of life of the 1.5 million people who live in Gaza. Approximately half a million people live in the eight refugee camps in Gaza. "Refugees remain the most vulnerable under present circumstances, and the community continues to experience rising levels of unemployment, food insecurity and poverty. Since Israel's 22-day military action against the Gaza Strip on 27 December 2008, the blockade of the Gaza Strip has prevented the United Nations from conducting any significant repairs or reconstruction. It also places severe restrictions on the goods and services which UNRWA supplies. An estimated 325,000 refugees are believed to be living in abject poverty, unable to meet their basic food needs. A further 350,000 are now below the official poverty line." (Doku S. …)

In all areas of basic supply, Gaza faces extreme problems. This includes electric power, water, the destruction of the economic infrastructure, the health conditions of the population, and basic food supplies. In all these areas, UNRWA is active. "Operating through more than 10,000 staff in over 200 installations, UNRWA provides education, health care, relief and social services, microcredit, and emergency assistance to the registered refugees in Gaza." (Doku S. …). In addition to supplying refugees with basic food, UNRWA is particularly involved in education for children and young people, and in supporting women. More than half the UNRWA budget is spent on education. The poor conditions resulting from the continued blockade do not permit any expansion of the schools, so that they have to operate in shifts, and the educational situation of children is hampered. Nonetheless, UNRWA attempts to continue to carry out its educational mission. "At UNRWA, each child has the right to an education that helps them achieve their full human potential. UNRWA's education system helps the refugees' children to thrive, achieve, and grow up understanding their rights, and respecting the rights of others. Moreover, UNRWA provides young people with the opportunity to learn new skills that will lead to work. This helps individuals and families escape poverty and attain their goals. We at UNRWA believe that to invest in the education and training of Palestinian refugees is to invest in peace." (Docu S. …) The pupils at the UNRWA schools are among the best educated in the region. Moreover,

half of them are girls. The Schools of Excellence Programme has been carried out since 2007, "emphasizing remedial education, focus on core subjects extra-curricular activities, basic support to students, student values and behaviour, improved student-teacher contact time and attention for children with special needs. It prepares pupils to become global citizens, respectful of one another and of differences among people." (Doku S….). Special emphasis is placed on the curriculum of human rights. For that, more than 200 teachers are being trained in human rights. In addition to school education, UNRWA organizes vocational education centres to provide young people with marketable skills.

Another important area of activity is the health service. "UNRWA's past achievements in health have been impressive, particularly in the areas of maternal and children's health, but the impact of deteriorating socio-economic conditions on the physical and mental health of people in Gaza poses a growing challenge. Nearly 200 community mental health counsellors in UNRWA schools assist troubled and special needs children through targeted individual and group intervention." (Docu, S….)

The social service programme, organized in more than 100 community-based organizations (CBOs), includes a broad variety of social, cultural and leisure time activities, including vocational education and rehabilitation measures. "The programme particularly addresses the needs of women, refugees with disabilities, young people and the elderly. It also helps vulnerable refugees through its micro-credit programme, which is managed by community-based organizations" (Doku, S….). The micro-credit programme supports small businesses, especially those run by women: "Many of the microfinance department's clients operate small, often informal businesses on the margins of the economy. They include vegetable stallholders, home seamstresses, garage owners and fishermen. Many run businesses that are not registered with the government, let alone the municipal or tax authorities." (Doku S….)

In spite of all the restrictions, big summer recreation programs for children and young people have been carried out in Gaza since 2007. "Children constitute the majority of the people in Gaza. For these children, life is overwhelmingly characterized by conflicts, poverty and despair. In UNRWA schools, they spend their days in overcrowded classrooms. Years of destruction, conflicts and deprivation have left few or no spaces in which children can participate in recreational or artistic activities, particularly during the long, hot summer months. …The games give Gazan kids a chance to have fun and a sense of normality, in an environment which is anything but normal." (Doku S…)

The main basic activities initiated by UNRWA can be seen as the resistance of the people of Gaza against the destruction of their condition of life. Ghada Al Jadba concludes with the following:

"As the blockade enters its fifth year, the summer games for Gaza's children also enter their fifth year. Those children have proved to the world that inside all of this despair and darkness, they still can play and laugh. They will never be broken. They blocked the blockade by enjoying their freedom. They are the centre of our invest-

ments, so we invest in them – in their education and their health. They are the future, by believing in peace, love and hope. They believe in limiting the imposed blockade only to the land, the air and the sea, but not to their minds and hearts." (Doku S….)

3.4.3   ISRAEL

> "The conflict, from my point of view, is a political national struggle between two national movements, who wish to exercise their fulfilment of aspirations over one land." (Molly Malekar)

Molly Malekar's report explores the attempts of peace building between Israel and Palestine, and provides insight into the efforts of the Israeli peace movement, and particularly the Israeli women's movement, to work against the occupation policies of the Israeli government, and to build cooperative projects and strategies together with Palestinian groups.

In her view, the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is as follows: "The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a political conflict directly connected to and born alongside the rise of the national aspirations of the Jews for an emancipation of the Jewish collective in the territory of the historic biblical land of Israel." (Doku, p.151). With the foundation of the State of Israel, the division of Jerusalem and the victory of the Israeli troops against the Arabs in 1948, the conflict that has continued to this day took shape. With the victory in the war of 1967 and the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, more than one million Palestinian citizens were brought under Israeli rule. After this war, the religious Jewish settler movement began to grow. "The remarkable victory of Israel gave rise, or more precisely, encouraged the existing messianic and religious sentiments. These elements, which had been 'tamed' or 'monitored' by the more secular and socialist leadership of the Zionist movement and the state of Israel, began to flourish, and, from now on, to dictate to the mainstream of Israeli politics and its decision-makers." (Doku, p. 153). After 1977, the politics of settlement-building became official Israeli policy after the takeover of power by the Likud government. However, the settlement strategy should not be seen only as a political problem, but also as a massive social and economic problem within Israel, for the economic and social structure that had existed up to that time, which had been more or less socialist, was massively transformed into the support of settlement activities in the occupied territories. "The government offered huge subsidies and benefits to the Israeli-Jewish citizens who moved to build their centre of life in the occupied territories. The huge allocation in the national budget for the settlements and the settlers, at the expense of the citizens living within the green line – Israel prior to 1967 – was an incentive to the less privileged elements of society and to those living in poor development towns and the periphery." (Doku, p. 153). . The incentive was not just economical. Building and living in these settlements provided the citizens of periphery the self image of patriots, the "new pioneers", following the legacy of the pioneers who built the country.

The first major uprising of the Palestinians in the occupied territories – the First Intifada – began in 1987. The weapons of the rebels consisted largely of leaflets and

stones. "Given the popular nature of the Palestinian uprising, the Israeli reaction is totally inexplicable. Israel killed a large number of Palestinians in the initial part of the Intifada, and most of them were apparently killed in demonstrations and riots." (Doku., p. 155). The Israeli society has gone through an identity crisis – the commonly know "enlightened occupation" concept collapsed. The UN reacted and condemned Israel's military action, and thus contributed to the events' reaching an international audience.

In 1989, the world changed. There followed the First Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events had their consequences on the Middle East politics. In 1991, the international Madrid conference on peace in the Middle East took place. Between 1993 and 1995, the PLO and Israel signed an interim agreement in Oslo, under which the Palestinian national leadership was to be recognized by Israel. The agreement included the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Gaza and most of the cities of the West Bank, but also divided the West Bank into three categories, which permitted continued administrative and military controlled by Israel. During this period, Israel also intensified settlement activities in the occupied territories. Beneath the level of the agreed-upon peace, the battles between the settlers, backed by the Israeli government and the Israeli army and the Palestinians continued. In February 1994, an extremist settler opened fire on Palestinians at the grave of Abraham in Hebron, and killed 29 people, before himself being killed. Hamas thereupon organized suicide bombings in the centres of Israeli cities. On November 5, 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was murdered by another Israeli extremist. In the spring of 1996, in the midst of Israeli election campaign, Hamas again organized suicide bombings, and thus contributed to the victory of Benjamin Netanyahu, an opponent of the Oslo process. Independently of that, an agreement was signed in 1997 for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Hebron, except for the protection of a small group of settlers in the middle of the old town. These settlers were – and still are – one of the most vocal and provocative groups, engaged in attacking Palestinians, actions commonly known as "price tag", namely, terrorist acts against Palestinian civilians..

In 1999, Ehud Barak of the Labour Party became Prime Minister. In his election campaign supported by the peace movement, he called for continuing the peace process, and at the same time continuing the settlement policies. Barack returned from Camp David with no results. By now, the time appeared ripe for new wave of violence on both sides. Ariel Sharon provoked that with his visit to the Temple Mount, and suicide bombings continued. Renewed attempts to restart the peace talks, such as Bill Clinton's Taba initiative, failed. The Second Intifada broke out and was considerably more violent than the first, due to "targeted assassinations and clashes between the Israeli army and the armed Palestinian militias." (Doku, p. 159)

After 9/11 and more suicide bombings, President Arafat was demonized as a Palestinian bin Laden, and his residence in Ramallah, as well as the streets and homes of the civilian population, were destroyed. The atmosphere in Israel changed. "Peace became unpopular. The general atmosphere on the streets, in buses, cafés, banks etc.

was of fear and panic. People were afraid to gather in public." Violence and retaliation dictated the relationship between the two societies.(Doku, p. 158)

The main issue in the Labour Party election campaign of 2003 was the construction of "separation wall" between Israel and the West Bank. After the victory of the Likud Party and of Sharon, that project was implemented, but in such a way that it pushed forward into Palestinian territory and encompassed the major settlement areas in the West Bank, so that Palestinian land and villages could only be accessed as exclaves. In 2005, Israeli government, headed by Areal Sharon, decided to evacuate 21 settlements in Gaza strip and four in the West Bank. These settlements, created in condensed Palestinian areas, became costly to safeguard. The protests of the settlers were directed not only against the Israeli police and government, but also against the Palestinians. The settlers warned of a civil war in Israel if their settlements should be dismantled. The aggressiveness of the settlers prior to and during their evacuation made it clear to normal citizens in Israel what dimensions the struggle might assume. Yet, the majority of the Israeli society supported the government, and resenting the settler's aggressions towards the police and military forces, who were assigned to dismantle the settlements.

In 2006, Hamas won the elections in the Palestinian territories. In 2007, militant Hamas fighters in Gaza shot members of the Fatah, causing Fatah fighters to flee to Egypt and Israel.

In 2006, the Second Lebanon War took place, so that Israel found itself fighting both on that northern front and on the southern front in Gaza. At the end of 2006, Israel launched a new diplomatic initiative with the goal of negotiating on the basis of a peace plan drafted by the Arab League. However, in the Annapolis negotiations, it was only possible to agree to hold future negotiations for permanent solution to the settlement issue. At the same time however, the Israeli government published contradictory positions on the future of Jerusalem, on settlement construction, on the annexation of parts of East Jerusalem, etc.

At the same time, as the exchange of fire between the Israeli armay and the Hamas militia continued, an increasing number of rockets were fired from Gaza against Israeli territory; on December 24, 2008, a total of 60 rockets were fired on Israeli towns and cities. Soon thereafter, Israel began the Gaza War, in which 1300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed, and a large part of the infrastructure in Gaza was destroyed. "The war was perfectly used by the right wing parties, who came to power in the elections held on February 10, 2009. The accession of the current government, made up of the extremist right, fascists and religious parties, marked the total defeat of the more moderate parties. This parliament is characterized by a weak opposition, peace-oriented parties are almost non-existent, and civil society groups which work on human rights, democracy and peace are under harsh attack ..." (Doku, S.163)

Molly Malekar describes Israeli national identity as highly complex. "The Jews in the world, as it is claimed by many, do not share a common language, culture, ethnic or genetic ancestry, have no common territory or history, and the beliefs of Jewish

communities vary. The only common element is religion and religious civilization, either directly (among the orthodox) or vague and distant, or even rejected (among the secular). With the definition of the Israeli state as a 'Jewish' state, the Israeli state cannot but fail to become an entity that safeguards and regulates the common interest of a pluralistic civil society and of the communities within its boundaries." (Doku., p. 166). This confusion, she says, as well as the battle with the Arab world for the land and the domination of it, have given Israel's political establishment the possibility to propagate a national identity built on the fear of persecution and destruction as a common historical experience of all Jews in the Diaspora. "Collective trauma and the epidemic of violence have dictated the environment, and reproduced more violence and trauma, and have prevented people from perceiving the other's victimhood as well. The symptoms of the traumatized society are:

- Israeli society is made up of immigrants and refugees. The majority of the Israelis experience the fragility of their existence in their new land, although spiritually and religiously, they do not doubt their connection to the land.
- The long and endless state of war has created emotional numbness. Lack of sensitivity to pain of the other is necessary for existence and the ability to function in state of ongoing emergency.
- There is agony and anger, which are unmanageable, and which obviously block the option to see the other's pain and anger.
- People look for a strong leader to lead them out of their distress. Abuse of power is tolerated and justified. Society has lost the immunity to resist the abuse of power.
- There is a collective addiction to violence, a call for revenge and retaliation.
- There is widespread escapism, and a passive acceptance of the 'situation'.
- Alienation and a lack of solidarity mean that each person is on his or her own.
- Internalized violence: The legitimation of the use of violence against the enemy is internalized, so that all opponents are perceived as the enemy, even within one's own society." (Doku p. 167-168).

In addition, militarization, as a factual institution and as an ideology determines societal life in Israel. This includes the subordination of women in military service as much as the functionalization of the family. "The importance of the family in Jewish society is magnified in the context of the political conflict. The family is used as the connecting link between the collective and the individual recruited to military service, and, in time of crisis, to war. Women, identified with the private sphere, the family, are expected to furnish maximum support to their men, and occasionally even sacrifice their dearest in time of war. The shadow of war makes the family an important factor." (Doku p. 168). Molly Malekar questions the ability of Israeli society to make peace in such a highly militarized society

"The biggest attempt of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians was made in the so-called people-to-people processes and encounters after the Oslo Accords. The rationale behind this programme was to enable the individual and the collective to get to know the other, to encourage a process of re-humanization, and to create a greater

sense of empathy, cooperation, and understanding among Israelis and Palestinians. It was assumed that this process would ultimately lead to reconciliation, which is one of the most meaningful conditions for a true and stable peace." (Doku p. 170). This approach did not meet with success, and was rather hampered by the political leadership on both sides.

Especially women took the possibilities of cooperation seriously. Bat Shalom, the organization of which Molly Malekar is the director, organized many meetings and projects together with Palestinian women. Looking back, she says: "There is a romantic perception that women from both sides of the national conflict will be able to transcend national boundaries. But nationalism tends to use the privilege of women's institutions to force women to demonstrate their ultimate loyalty to their own national collective." (Doku p. 172). The relationships between Palestinian and Israeli women remained asymmetrical. "Palestinian women hoped that Israeli women would mobilize support against the occupation within Israel, and would acknowledge the asymmetry of power defining their relationship." (Doku p. 173). However: "Israeli women, especially the core group of activists, who came to the meeting as individuals, are already positioned in their own society as 'non-conformists', and as critical towards their own government and society..." (Doku S.174) Molly Malekar concludes her report with the assessment: "Yet, long years of dialogue between the two sides have produced many personal relationships and trust. Joint meetings have been resourceful. It has been an opportunity to exchange sentiments, deliver messages, provide analysis, and learn about each other's society directly and authentically. But these rare occasions and this trust-building did not hold very long, once things on the ground got violent. We could still meet informally, talk over the phone, exchange e-mails – but the friendly personal trust did not soften the content of the conversation." (Doku p. 176).

3.4.4 BRIDGE-BUILDING

By Simone Susskind

During the past forty years, peace activism has been a central pioneering precursor – and often a substitute – for official attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Women have played a central role in these efforts, both in mixed-gender organizations and, since 1987, in a variety of Israeli, Palestinian, and joint women's peace initiatives.

Israeli-Palestinian women's peace action has developed in three distinct phases:

The initial phase, which coincided with the First Intifada (1987-1993), witnessed the emergence of separate grassroots women's organizations, such as Women in Black, and the convening of the first Palestinian-Israeli women's meeting held in Brussels in May 1989, under the title: "Give Peace a Chance – Women Speak Out". Phase Two developed around the Oslo process (1993-2000); it was accompanied by the emergence of a number of Israeli and Palestinian women's groups dedicated to supporting gender-based encounters, but also by the consolidation of a common framework for political action, the network "Jerusalem Link: A Women's Joint Venture for Peace".

THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
PROJECT REPORT, 2011

The Jerusalem Link was founded in 1994, following a second encounter between Israeli and Palestinian women organized in Belgium in September 1992. The third phase started in 2000, and has been accompanied by the creation of additional grass-roots women's groups, such as Machsom Watch or the Coalition of Women for Peace, and by a renewed effort to revive the diplomatic process.

Palestinian and Israeli women's peace initiatives have differed from those of their mixed-gender counterparts in several important respects. They have been pioneering, clearly defining central political agenda items, a step ahead of the bulk of the peace camp: In May 1989 in Brussels, for instance, Israeli and Palestinian women called for mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the PLO, and an end to the occupation. Second, women's peace action has been extremely persistent in refusing to give in, in the face of the deterioration of the situation on the ground. And third, it has focused on a series of concrete actions: It was Jerusalem Link which took the initiative in organizing an international political, academic and cultural event in June 1997 on the theme "Sharing Jerusalem – Two Capitals for Two States", at a time when this idea was taboo for the immense majority of Israeli public opinion, even within the peace camp. Woman activists, however, have been consistently excluded from official or semi-official initiatives, and their distinctive perspectives have been largely ignored.

Over time however, Israeli-Palestinian women's peace movements progressively lost their impact, both in Palestinian and in Israeli public opinion, as did the peace camps, confronted with the deterioration of the peace process.

It is within this context that a group of veteran Israeli and Palestinian woman activists decided to take a critical look at their past efforts, with a view toward increasing their efficacy. Building on years of joint peace work and the personal trust that had developed as a result, they looked at ways of overcoming existing pitfalls, and for designing a more efficient and productive framework for action.

The conceptual starting point for what was eventually to become the International Women's Commission for a Just and Sustainable Palestinian-Israeli Peace (IWC) was the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for ensuring not only protection for women in conflict situations, but also recognizes women's contributions and advocates their active participation in all stages of peace-making and peace-building. Besides highlighting the potential power inherent in women's peace efforts, Resolution 1325, by furnishing a broad international umbrella, indirectly suggested a way to overcome the bilateral impasse in Israeli-Palestinian relations at that time.

In July 2005, at a strategic planning meeting in Istanbul, 40 Palestinian, Israeli and international woman leaders and advocates founded the International Women's Commission for a Just and Sustainable Palestinian-Israeli Peace. Its Charter of Principles stresses the goal of ending the Israeli occupation through immediate final-status negotiations on a two-state solution. It also underlines the need to hold all parties ac-

countable for fulfilling their obligations under UNSC Resolution 1325, to include women in the process.

The mission of the IWC was clearly stated in the charter: First, to work for an end to the occupation, and for genuine negotiations towards a just and sustainable peace; Second, to promote a process of political dialogue in order to rectify ongoing asymmetries and address all elements of reconciliation; third, to ensure the meaningful participation of various women, including those from civil society, in any Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and fourth, to guarantee that women's perspectives and experiences be incorporated in any accord, in order to enhance gender equality and societal well-being.

The list of activities elaborated at the founding meeting of the IWC to carry out this agenda was ambitious and innovative, ranging from the formulation of political positions on key issues or events taking place on the ground, through advocacy at the highest level, to the mobilization of broad constituencies.

The activities of the IWC focused on several main areas: The first involved monitoring political developments and formulating gender-driven political positions; the second focused on lobbying decision-makers, and advocacy in society; and the third focused on the mobilization of local constituencies.

At the end of 2010 however, the IWC members agreed to end the activities of the organization, because they were not able to all work together anymore. This was directly linked to the 2008 Israeli military operation against Gaza. It is important to bear in mind that some 80 percent of the Israeli public approved of the military intervention – including women who were members of the IWC. For Palestinian women, there was no way to work with partners who justified the Israeli attack. And the attack on the Gaza aid flotilla, which left nine Turkish crew members dead, raised tensions still further.

On top of these polarizing events, a general fatigue about the entrenched conflict had afflicted the group. The women involved had been fighting for a cause they considered just, but then they came to see that the conflict was moving in the opposite direction.

All along, throughout the more than 20 years of common activities for a just peace, the relations between the Palestinian and the Israeli woman activists were in effect based on asymmetrical conditions, due to the huge differences in the daily lives of women in the two societies.

3.4.5 SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The Middle East conflict is not comparable with the other cases in terms of international ramifications and the development of violence within it, even if certain instances are certainly similar. The Middle East conflict shows, in all its phases, how dramatically the international community can repeatedly fail, and how mutual disillusionment over unfulfilled hopes for peace can again and again lead to the escalation of violence. The spiral of violence and cynicism shows a degree of negative creativity

that never fails to shock. The main issue in the conflict is the struggle for land, and state autonomy. In the background however, both sides are continually mythologizing history and using religion as legitimation. It also seems that both sides understand each other's wounds perfectly well, and know best to direct their attacks.

Unlike the other cases of war and conflict examined in our project, the Middle East conflict has been going on for over 60 years and no solution is in sight. Another difference from the other cases is that here, we are dealing with a peace movement on both sides, so that we have here, in terms of the cooperation in the framework of our project, a reverse asymmetry: while in real life, the superior power of Israel and the factual inferiority and weakness of the Palestinian side is evident, the relationship in the cooperation between the Israeli peace movement and those Palestinian groups willing to cooperate with it is exactly reversed: the Israeli peace movement is a weak, currently vanishingly small minority in Israel, which is ignored by its own public opinion and by the majority of its own people. Publicly prominent personalities who make a commitment to the peace process are often subjected to attacks and insults. The representatives of the Palestinian side who are prepared for civil society cooperation, on the other hand, always also represent the collective interests of the Palestinian people. This reverse asymmetry is, in the difficult process of understanding between Palestinian and Israeli peace forces, impossible to overlook. On the other hand, the small peace projects, the participation of Israeli-Jewish activists in protests, and the cooperation between women of both sides represents a peace dividend in time of violence and war – a peace dividend which depends on the home for peace, and refuses to abandon this hope.

The history of the Middle East conflict implies consequences of colonialism just as much as consequences of the rule of the Nazi regime in Europe and the extermination of European Jewry. The colonial power Great Britain initially supported the settlement of Jewish immigrants, and then ended it during World War II, during a time of the greatest existential emergency of European Jews. In 1948, it supported a two-state solution, and then vanished from the scene under pressure from the Jewish uprising. No Western country could, in 1948, after the murder of 6 million European Jews by the Nazis, dare to fight against the founding of the state of Israel.

We must not forget the experience of the survivors who were able to flee that inferno: virtually no country in the world had been prepared to accept them without conditions, and many refugees did not succeed in finding a safe haven, since they had to wait too long for a visa, or had no chance of getting one in the first place. Without a doubt, Israeli policy cannot be understood without the background of this collective Jewish trauma.

The psychological warfare is being carried out by it both sides with extreme precision:

The Palestinian reaction to the expulsion from their country has from the start targeted this trauma of the Jewish population: first, as a threat to destroy the state of Israel and drive out all Jews from the country, and more recently, through suicide bombs against the civilian population. Thus has Palestinian resistance in its most mili-

tant form from the start contributed to that mixture of a feeling of victimization and a security phobia in Israeli society which can only be explained socio-psychologically.

On the other hand, the Israeli occupying power in the Palestinian territories, viewed socio-psychologically, in the same way precisely targets the collective trauma of the Palestinian people. The trauma of the Naqba, the catastrophe of expulsion from one's own country, the trauma of over 60 years of life in refugee camps for relevant part of the Palestinian population is permanently being called to memory, even for the non-refugees in the occupied territories. The policies of separating off villages and Palestinian land, the ghettoization of the Palestinian people and the continuing appropriation of land for settlement construction, the aggressiveness of the settlers, the arbitrary closing of checkpoints, and the fundamental restrictions on the freedom to travel for the Palestinian people, all the way to the closing off of the Gaza Strip, have revealed directly to every Palestinian, every day, that if he or she is not a refugee now, they could become one tomorrow – homeless in the world or ghettoized in a camp.

The willingness to engage in a peace process can only emerge in both societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian, if civil society is strengthened and the peaceful neighbourliness becomes a worthwhile goal for the majorities of both peoples. War and violence, collective punishment and psychological humiliation are permanently destroying the willingness for peace on both sides. In this context, the situation in Gaza is especially dramatic. Here, not only is the entire population being made responsible for the actions of a few militant groups, but the UN's refugee aid system is permanently being hampered in its efforts to provide the refugees with the basics of life.

The failure of the international community is highlighted directly by the large number of resolutions on the Middle East conflict passed by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. There have been a total of 30 resolutions of the General Assembly since 1947, and 233 resolutions of the Security Council, all aimed at a solution of the Middle East conflict, or of a particular situation of war and violence current at the time. The disregard for the United Nations as the only instance with international legitimation for peace processes and for ending violence and war is a shocking fact of the Middle East conflict. The delegitimizing and demoralizing effect of this fact, extending far beyond the bounds of this concrete conflict, should not be underestimated.

In this situation, the strategy of nonviolent resistance in order to defend access to closed-off villages and oppose the expulsion of Palestinian families from East Jerusalem, and the reconstruction by the Palestinian administration and international aid organizations in the West Bank of the infrastructure destroyed by the military actions of the Israeli army, as well as the tireless work of UNWRA in Gaza, are the only ray of hope. The participation of young Israelis in demonstrations and actions of nonviolent resistance are also important.

4   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Will be presented at the 24/25 November 2011 conference.

5   LITERATURE

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    isierte Gewalt in bewaffneten Konflikten erfahren haben?", Köln 2008

Mukagasana, Yolande, La mort ne veut pas de moi, Paris 1997

6   NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONS

WOMEN'S NETWORKS

OpenDemocracy, www.opendemocracy.co.uk

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, WLPF,
	www.peacewomen.org

Women in Black, www.womeninblack.org

Code Pink, www.codepinkalert.org

Women's Portal of the International Action Network on Small Arms, www.iansa.org

Medica Mondiale, Support for traumatised women and girls in war and crisis zones,
	www.medicamondiale.org

ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE

EEA, European Environment Agency www.eea.europa.eu

Green Net: Networking for the Environment, Peace, Human Rights and Development,
	uk, www.gn.apc.org

Greenpeace International, www.greenpeace.org

IGBP, International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, www.igbp2008.co.za

UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme, www.unep.org

DISARMAMENT

ABACC, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials,
	www.abacc.org.br

Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, uk, www.acronym.org.uk

Archivio Disarmo, it, www.archiviodisarmo.it

BASIC, Brithish-American Security Information Council, www.basicint.org.

BICC, Bonn International Center for Conversion, de, www.bicc.de

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientis, us, www.thebulletin.org.

CBTBO, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, www.ctbto.org.

Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, www.ctbto.org.

IALANA, InternationalAssociation of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, nl,
	www.ialana.de.

IANSA, International Action Network on Small Arms, uk, www.iansa.org.

ICBL, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, www.icbl.org

ISODARCO, International School On Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, it,
	www.isodarco.it

OPANAL, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
	Caribbean, www.opanal.org.

OPCW, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, nl, www.opcw.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, se, www.sipri.org

UNDC, United Nations Disarmament Commission,
www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/DisarmamentCommission/UNDiscom.sht
ml

UNIDIR, UnitedNations Institute for Disarmament Research,www.unidir.org.

United Nations Conference on Disarmament, www.unidir.org.

United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, www.un.org/disarmament.

United Nations Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Affairs,
www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/AdvisoryBoard/AdvisoryBoard.shtml

USPID, Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo, it, www.uspid.org/ENindex.html

VERTIC, Verification Research, Training and Information Center, uk, www.vertic.org

STUDY CENTERS

ASPR, Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, at,
www.aspr.ac.at/aspr

Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, de, www.berghof-
conflictresearch.org

Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Wayne State University, us,
www.clas.wayne.edu/PCS

Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California, us,
www.cgpacs.uci.edu

Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Limerick, ie,
www3.ul.ie/cpds

Centro Studi Sereno Regis, it, www.serenoregis.org.

CPACS, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sidney, au,
www.sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict

CUSRP, Centro Studi e Ricerche per la Pace, Università di Trieste, it,
www.units.it/cusrp

Department of Peace and Conflict Reasearch, University of Uppsala,
www.sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict

Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, uk, www.brad.ac.uk/peace

GRIP, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité, www.grip.org

Hiroshima Peace Center, Hiroshima City University, jp, www.hiroshima-
cu.ac.jp/Hiroshima-and-Peace

ICAR, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, us,
www.icar.gmu.edu

IFVH, Institute for the International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr-University
Bochum, de, www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ifhv

INCORE, Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, uk, www.incore.ulst.ac.uk

IPACS, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Waterloo, ca,
www.grebel.uwaterloo.ca/academic/undergrad/pacs

IPRA, International Peace Research Association, www.iprafoundation.org

IWA, Institute of World Affairs, us, www.iwa.org

Life & Peace Institute, se, www.life-peace.org

Matsunaga Institute for Peace, Hawaii University, us, www.peaceinstitute.hawaii.edu

Menno Simons College, University of Winnipeg, ca, www.mscollege.ca

Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto, ca,
    www.munkschool.utoronto.ca/trudeaucentre

Peace Studies Resource Institute, University of Wisconsin, us,
    www4.uwm.edu/letsci/certificates/peace

PRIF, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, de,

PRIUB, Peace Research Information Unit, Bonn, de, www.hsfk.de

Richardson Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Lancaster Univer-
    sity,uk, www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/centres/richinst.

SHIP, Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research, Christian Albrechts University,
    Kiel, de, www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/centres/richinst

TARI, Trans-Arab Research Institute, us, www.tari.org

TFF, Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, se,
    www.transnational.org

HUMAN RIGHTS

Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org

Archivio Pace Diritti Umani, University of Padova, it, www.unipd-centrodirittiumani.it

Derechos, Human Rights, www.derechos.net

EMHRN, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, www.euromedrights.org

FIDH, Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, www.fidh.org

Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, uk,
    www.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre

Human Rights Watch, Defending Human Rights Worldwide

IHF, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, at, www.ihf-hr.org

Norwegian Helsinki Committee, no, www.humanrightshouse.org

OMCT – WOAT, World Organization Against Torture, www.omct.org

SHRC, Syrian Human Rights Committee, uk, www.shrc.org

University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, us, www1.umn.edu/humanrts

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, us, www.carnegieendowment.org

Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) Berlin www.zif-berlin.org

Center for International Policy, us, www.ciponline.org

Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technol-
    ogy (ETH), ch, www.isn.ethz.ch

Centro de Investigación para la Paz, es, www.ceipaz.org

CIPDD, The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development,
    www.cipdd.org

CISAC, Center for International Security And Cooperation, Stanford University, us,
    www.cisac.stanford.edu

CNS, Center for Non proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
    us, www.cns.miis.edu/

COPRI, Copenaghen Peace Research Institute, dk, www.copri.com

EPLO, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, www.eplo.org

GIPRI, Geneva International Peace Research Institute, ch,
www.gpplatform.ch/pbguide/organisation/geneva-international-peace-research-
institute-gipri.

ICG, International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org

IISS, International Institute for Strategic Studies, uk, www.iiss.org

OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, www.oecd.org

Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, us,
www.pacinst.org

PRIO, International Peace Research Institute of Oslo, no, www.prio.no

Pugwash, The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,
www.pugwash.org

TAPRI, Tampere Peace Research Institute, fi, www.uta.fi/yky/en/research/tapri

Toda Institute, for Global Peace and Policy Research, jp, www.toda.org

UNIDPKO, United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations,
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping

United States Institute of Peace, us, www.usip.org

SCIENCE AND PEACE

FAS, Federation of American Scientists, us, www.fas.org

INES, The International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility,
de, www.inesglobal.com

IPPNW, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, www.ippnw.org

SGR, Scientists for Global Responsibility, uk, www.sgr.org.uk

Union of Concerned Scientists, Citizens and Scientists for Environmental Solutions,
us, www.ucsusa.org

COOPERATION AND LIFE SUPPORT

AAR, Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), jp

AIETI, Asociación de Investigación y Especialización sobre Temas Ibero-americanos,
es, www.aieti.es/newaieti

ASPA, Asociación andaluza por la solidaridad y la paz, es

Ayuda en Acción, es, www.ayudaenaccion.org

CTM altro mercato - fair trade, it, www.altromercato.it

Emergency, Life support for civilians war victims, it, www.emergency.it

GRET, Groupe de recherche et d'échanges technologiques, fr, www.gret.org

ICS, Italian Consortium of Solidarity, it, www.icsitalia.org

Landmine Monitor, www.the-monitor.org

Mani Tese, Un impegno di giustizia, it, www.manitese.it/a-commitment-to-justice-
since-45-years/

NPA, Norwegian Peoples Aid, no, www.npaid.org/en/

WFD, Weltfriedensdienst, www.wfd.de

OTHERS

ACCORD, African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, za,
     www.accord.org.za

Fourth Freedom Forum, Exploring Options for the Nonviolent Resolution of Interna-
     tional Conflict, www.fourthfreedom.org

ICG, Institute for Global Communications, CA, us

NISAT, Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, no, www.prio.no/NISAT

Nonviolent Peaceforce, www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org

SCI, Service Civil International, www.sciint.org

Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, se, www.svenskafreds.se